Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form : should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?

1. Person: Bucovetsky, Sam
Weitere Personen: Haufler, Andreas
Format: Online-Artikel
Sprache: English
Veröffentlicht: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) 2005
Serien: CESifo Working Paper
Schlagworte: Steuerwettbewerb
Steuerbegünstigung
Multinationales Unternehmen
Rechtsformwahl
Kapitalertragsteuer
Extensives Spiel
Zwei-Länder-Modell
Theorie
Tax competition
Transnational corporation
Choice of organizational form
Capital income tax
Extensive form game
Theory
Online Zugang: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19089/1/cesifo1_wp1625.pdf
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oai_econstor.eu_10419-19089
recordtype
econstor
institution
MPG
collection
ECONSTOR
title
Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form : should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
spellingShingle
Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form : should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
Steuerwettbewerb
Steuerbegünstigung
Multinationales Unternehmen
Rechtsformwahl
Kapitalertragsteuer
Extensives Spiel
Zwei-Länder-Modell
Theorie
Tax competition
Transnational corporation
Choice of organizational form
Capital income tax
Extensive form game
Theory
Bucovetsky, Sam
CESifo Working Paper
title_short
Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form : should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
title_full
Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form : should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
title_fullStr
Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form : should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
title_full_unstemmed
Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form : should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
title_sort
Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form : should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
format
electronic Article
format_phy_str_mv
Paper
publisher
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
publishDate
2005
language
English
topic
Steuerwettbewerb
Steuerbegünstigung
Multinationales Unternehmen
Rechtsformwahl
Kapitalertragsteuer
Extensives Spiel
Zwei-Länder-Modell
Theorie
Tax competition
Transnational corporation
Choice of organizational form
Capital income tax
Extensive form game
Theory
topic_facet
Tax competition
Transnational corporation
Choice of organizational form
Capital income tax
Extensive form game
Theory
author
Bucovetsky, Sam
author2
Haufler, Andreas
author2Str
Haufler, Andreas
description
We analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries when firms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings. Governments are able to commit to long-run tax discrimination policies before firms' decisions are made and before statutory capital tax rates are chosen non-cooperatively. Whether a coordinated reduction in the tax preferences granted to mobile firms is beneficial or harmful for the competing countries depends critically on the elasticity with which the firms' organizational structure responds to tax discrimination incentives. The model can be applied to policy initiatives that aim at a ban on preferential tax regimes and at reducing the profit shifting opportunities for multinational firms.
url
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19089/1/cesifo1_wp1625.pdf
series
CESifo Working Paper
seriesStr
CESifo Working Paper
CESifo Working Paper
series2
CESifo Working Paper
series2_facet
CESifo Working Paper
up_date
2019-10-23T02:54:27.012Z
_version_
1648151013012537344

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