Technology diffusion and the stability of climate coalitions

1. Person: Tol, Richard S. J.
Weitere Personen: Lise, Wietze; van der Zwaan, Bob
Format: Online-Artikel
Sprache: English
Veröffentlicht: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 2000
Serien: Nota di Lavoro
Schlagworte: Klimaschutz
Internationale Umweltpolitik
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Technologietransfer
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Climate protection
International environmental policy
Free rider problem
Technology transfer
Game theory
Theory
Online Zugang: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155074
Volltext
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id
oai_econstor.eu_10419-155074
recordtype
econstor
institution
MPG
collection
ECONSTOR
title
Technology diffusion and the stability of climate coalitions
spellingShingle
Technology diffusion and the stability of climate coalitions
Klimaschutz
Internationale Umweltpolitik
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Technologietransfer
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Climate protection
International environmental policy
Free rider problem
Technology transfer
Game theory
Theory
Tol, Richard S. J.
Nota di Lavoro
title_short
Technology diffusion and the stability of climate coalitions
title_full
Technology diffusion and the stability of climate coalitions
title_fullStr
Technology diffusion and the stability of climate coalitions
title_full_unstemmed
Technology diffusion and the stability of climate coalitions
title_sort
Technology diffusion and the stability of climate coalitions
format
electronic Article
format_phy_str_mv
Paper
publisher
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
publishDate
2000
language
English
topic
Klimaschutz
Internationale Umweltpolitik
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Technologietransfer
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Climate protection
International environmental policy
Free rider problem
Technology transfer
Game theory
Theory
topic_facet
Climate protection
International environmental policy
Free rider problem
Technology transfer
Game theory
Theory
author
Tol, Richard S. J.
author2
Lise, Wietze
van der Zwaan, Bob
author2Str
Lise, Wietze
van der Zwaan, Bob
description
Free-riding is a major problem for international climate policy. A country can take advantage of other countries' emission reduction without contributing to abatement policies itself. Game theory suggests that issue linkage may help to overcome free-riding. Earlier studies suggest that if negotiations on greenhouse gas emission reduction are coupled to negotiation on technology transfer, the incentives to co-operate increase. This study confirms that finding. A country has less reason to free-ride if free-riding implies that the countries loses access to desirable, foreign technologies. We also show that, in many cases, it hurts to deny another country access to domestic technologies, if that country retaliates by withholding its technologies. We further show that the losses of withholding abatement technologies are small relative to the gains of free-riding. So, linking greenhouse gas emission reduction with technology diffusion helps to deter free-riding, but only a little bit, and only if the two issues are automatically linked.
url
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155074
series
Nota di Lavoro
seriesStr
Nota di Lavoro
Nota di Lavoro
series2
Nota di Lavoro
series2_facet
Nota di Lavoro
up_date
2019-09-19T02:54:24.056Z
_version_
1645070717081878533

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