Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment

The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial allocation of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that conditi... Ausführliche Beschreibung

1. Person: Bar-Gill, Oren
Weitere Personen: Engel, Christoph
Format: Buch
Veröffentlicht: Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015
Beschreibung: 46 p.
Schlagworte: Coase theorem absolute vs. relative right bargaining efficiency distribution fairness
Online Zugang: pre-print
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