Strategic Disclosure of Demand Information by Duopolists: Theory and Experiment

We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor’s product-market s... Ausführliche Beschreibung

1. Person: Jansen, Jos
Weitere Personen: Pollak, Andreas
Format: Buch
Veröffentlicht: Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015
Beschreibung: 44 p.
Schlagworte: common value product differentiation Asymmetry Duopoly information disclosure skewed distribution Incomplete Information laboratory experiment Cournot competition Bertrand competition JEL-Codes: D82 L13 C92 D83 D22 M4
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