Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma

We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric... Ausführliche Beschreibung

1. Person: Nikiforakis, Nikos
Weitere Personen: Normann, Hans-Theo; Wallace, Brian
Format: Buch
Veröffentlicht: Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009
Online Zugang: pre-print
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