Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights

I study the incentives of Cournot duopolists to share their technologies with their competitor in markets where intellectual property rights are absent and imitation is costless. The trade-off between a signaling effect and an expropriation effect determines the technology-sharing incentives. In equ... Ausführliche Beschreibung

1. Person: Jansen, Jos
Format: Buch
Veröffentlicht: Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009
Online Zugang: pre-print
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