Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design

This paper extends the model of optimal income taxation due to Mirrlees (1971) and includes private information on public goods preferences. A mechanism design approach is used to establish the following result: If policies are required to be robustly implementable in the sense of Bergemann and Morr... Ausführliche Beschreibung

1. Person: Bierbrauer, Felix
Format: Buch
Veröffentlicht: Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008
Online Zugang: pre-print
Volltext
Tags: Hinzufügen
Keine Tags. Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Online

pre-print

Ähnliche Einträge

Keine ähnlichen Titel gefunden

Privacy Notice Ask a Librarian New Acquisitions