Inflation Bias, Output Stabilization, and Central Bank Independence: Habil.-Schrift

117;222;148... Ausführliche Beschreibung

1. Person: Jordan, Thomas J.
Format: Buch
Sprache: German
Veröffentlicht: Haupt Verlag 2001
Beschreibung: This study considers the inflation bias and the output consequences of discretionary monetary policy with and without central bank independence. Standard economic theory suggests that discretionary monetary policy leads to an inflation bias only if the policymaker pursues an output goal which exceeds natural output and that it does not affect the ability to stabilize output fluctuations. This study however shows that discretionary monetary policy can lead to an inflation bias even in the absence of an output goal exceeding natural output and that it can reduce the ability to stabilize output fluctuations. The models developed by the author offer new explanations for the occurrence of an inflation bias and for the relation between the degree of central bank independence and the variability of output. Thereby he points out that central bank independence is of greater importance than generally assumed in the relevant literature.
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id
VUB9783258062662
isbn
9783258062662
recordtype
vub
institution
MPG
collection
VUB
language
German
format
Book
author
Jordan, Thomas J.
spellingShingle
Jordan, Thomas J.
Inflation Bias, Output Stabilization, and Central Bank Independence;Habil.-Schrift

author-letter
Jordan, Thomas J.
title
Inflation Bias, Output Stabilization, and Central Bank Independence;Habil.-Schrift
title_short
Inflation Bias, Output Stabilization, and Central Bank Independence;Habil.-Schrift
title_full
Inflation Bias, Output Stabilization, and Central Bank Independence;Habil.-Schrift
title_fullStr
Inflation Bias, Output Stabilization, and Central Bank Independence;Habil.-Schrift
title_full_unstemmed
Inflation Bias, Output Stabilization, and Central Bank Independence;Habil.-Schrift
title_sort
Inflation Bias, Output Stabilization, and Central Bank Independence;Habil.-Schrift
title_sub
Habil.-Schrift
publisher
Haupt Verlag
publishDate
2001
description
117;222;148
thumbnail
http://vub.de/cover/data/isbn%3A9783258062662/medium/true/de/vub/cover.jpg
physical
This study considers the inflation bias and the output consequences of discretionary monetary policy with and without central bank independence. Standard economic theory suggests that discretionary monetary policy leads to an inflation bias only if the policymaker pursues an output goal which exceeds natural output and that it does not affect the ability to stabilize output fluctuations. This study however shows that discretionary monetary policy can lead to an inflation bias even in the absence of an output goal exceeding natural output and that it can reduce the ability to stabilize output fluctuations. The models developed by the author offer new explanations for the occurrence of an inflation bias and for the relation between the degree of central bank independence and the variability of output. Thereby he points out that central bank independence is of greater importance than generally assumed in the relevant literature.
topic

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sofort lieferbar
up_date
2020-02-23T03:54:24.434Z
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