The art and craft of policy analysis: reissued with a new introduction by B. Guy Peters

The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis is a classic work of the Public Policy discipline. Wildavsky's emphasis on the values involved in public policies, as well as the need to build political understandings about the nature of policy, are as important for 21st century policymaking as they were in 197... Ausführliche Beschreibung

1. Person: Wildavsky, Aaron B.
Weitere Personen: Peters, B. Guy
Format: Buch
Sprache: English
Veröffentlicht: Cham Palgrave Macmillan 2018
Beschreibung: lii, 508 Seiten
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520 |a The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis is a classic work of the Public Policy discipline. Wildavsky's emphasis on the values involved in public policies, as well as the need to build political understandings about the nature of policy, are as important for 21st century policymaking as they were in 1979. B. Guy Peters' critical introduction provides the reader with context for the book, its main themes and contemporary relevance, and offers a guide to understanding a complex but crucial text. 
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992 |a THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS *EVEN AFTER HALF A CENTURY OF READING PUBLIC POLICY WORKS, IF I WERE TO BE LIMITED TO ONE PROFESSIONAL BOOK, IT WOULD BE THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS . AARON WILDAVSKY, A FOUNDER OF THE FIELD, WAS DETERMINED TO TEACH ITS MEMBERS TO ABOVE ALL QUESTION *RECEIVED* WISDOM. CRITICISM, WHILE ESSENTIAL, IS NOT ENOUGH, HE COUN- SELED. POLICY ANALYSIS MUST CONTRIBUTE TO ADDRESSING PROBLEMS. THE MARK OF GOOD PUBLIC POLICY IS WHETHER TODAY*S PROBLEMS ARE LESS DIVISIVE AND MORE SOLUBLE THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY FACED. AT THE END OF THE 1970S, AFTER TWO TUMULTUOUS DECADES OF REVOLUTIONARY POLICIES AFFECTING CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, WILDAVSKY WAS POSITIVE ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTION OF POLICY. CAN WE COME TO THE SAME JUDGEMENT TODAY? THIS BOOK CAN TEACH THE READER HOW TO DO THE ANALYSIS.* *HELEN INGRAM, PROFESSOR EMERITA IN PLANNING, POLICY, AND DESIGN AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, USA AARONWILDAVSKY THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS REISSUED WITH A NEW INTRODUCTION BY B.GUY PETERS ISBN 978-3-319-58618-2 ISBN 978-3-319-58619-9 (EBOOK) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58619-9 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONTROL NUMBER: 2017947756 THE EDITOR(S) (IF APPLICABLE) AND THE AUTHOR(S) 2018 THIS WORK IS SUBJECT TO COPYRIGHT. ALL RIGHTS ARE SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY LICENSED BY THE PUBLISHER, WHETHER THE WHOLE OR PART OF THE MATERIAL IS CONCERNED, SPECIFICALLY THE RIGHTS OF TRANSLATION, REPRINTING, REUSE OF ILLUSTRATIONS, RECITATION, BROADCASTING, REPRODUCTION ON MICROFILMS OR IN ANY OTHER PHYSICAL WAY, AND TRANSMISSION OR INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL, ELECTRONIC ADAPTATION, COMPUTER SOFTWARE, OR BY SIMILAR OR DISSIMILAR METHODOLOGY NOW KNOWN OR HEREAFTER DEVELOPED. THE USE OF GENERAL DESCRIPTIVE NAMES, REGISTERED NAMES, TRADEMARKS, SERVICE MARKS, ETC. IN THIS PUBLICATION DOES NOT IMPLY, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC STATEMENT, THAT SUCH NAMES ARE 
992 |a EXEMPT FROM THE RELEVANT PROTECTIVE LAWS AND REGULATIONS AND THEREFORE FREE FOR GENERAL USE. THE PUBLISHER, THE AUTHORS AND THE EDITORS ARE SAFE TO ASSUME THAT THE ADVICE AND INFORMATION IN THIS BOOK ARE BELIEVED TO BE TRUE AND ACCURATE AT THE DATE OF PUBLICATION. NEITHER THE PUB- LISHER NOR THE AUTHORS OR THE EDITORS GIVE A WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH RESPECT TO THE MATERIAL CONTAINED HEREIN OR FOR ANY ERRORS OR OMISSIONS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN MADE. THE PUBLISHER REMAINS NEUTRAL WITH REGARD TO JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS IN PUBLISHED MAPS AND INSTITU- TIONAL AFFILIATIONS. COVER ILLUSTRATION: GJOHNSTONPHOTO PRINTED ON ACID-FREE PAPER THIS PALGRAVE MACMILLAN IMPRINT IS PUBLISHED BY SPRINGER NATURE THE REGISTERED COMPANY IS SPRINGER INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING AG THE REGISTERED COMPANY ADDRESS IS: GEWERBESTRASSE 11, 6330 CHAM, SWITZERLAND AARONWILDAVSKY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA, USA INTRODUCTION BY B.GUY PETERS PITTSBURGH UNIVERSITY PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, USA FOR GALE GORDON M.V.M.F.R.J.D. VII THIS BOOK RECITES LESSONS I HAVE LEARNED FROM MY TEACHERS: THE STUDENTS, STAFF, AND FACULTY AT THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY. TWO CHAPTERS HAVE BEEN COAUTHORED WITH STU- DENTS AT THE SCHOOL: DAVID GOOD ON *A TAX BY ANY OTHER NAME,* AND BOB GAMBLE, PRESLEY PANG, FRITZIE REISNER, AND GLEN SHOR ON *COORDINATION WITHOUT A COORDINATOR.* PRESLEY PANG USED HIS INCISIVE UNDERSTAND- ING TO HELP ME TEASE OUT THE CRAFT ASPECTS OF POLICY ANALYSIS. THE CHAPTER *DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN SERVICES* ORIGINALLY APPEARED, IN SLIGHTLY DIFFER- ENT FORM, IN URBAN OUTCOMES: SCHOOLS, STREETS, AND LIBRARIES , WITH FRANK S.LEVY, AND ARNOLD J.MELTSNER, CO-AUTHORS WHO ARE ALSO COLLEAGUES. MY COLLABORATORS ON TWO OTHER CHAPTERS*JACK KNOTT ON *JIMMY CARTERS THEORY OF GOVERNING,* AND BRUCE WALLEN ON *OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND MERIT WANTS**WERE THEN STUDENTS IN THE POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT. 
992 |a NO ONE KNOWS ENOUGH ABOUT THE BROAD SWEEP OF PUBLIC POLICY TO DO IT ALONE AND I HAVE NOT TRIED. LIKE EVERYONE ELSE I HAVE BENEFITTED BY READING CLASSICS IN THE FIELD* YEHEZKEL DROR PUBLIC POLICY MAKING REEXAMINED (SAN FRANCISCO: CHANDLER, 1968), CHARLES HITCH AND ROWLAND MCKEAN*S THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE (CAMBRIDGE: HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1960 FOR THE RAND CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA), E.S. QUADE ANALYSIS FOR MILITARY DECISIONS (NEW YORK: ELSEVIER, 1970), SIR GEOFFREY VICKERS* THE ART OF JUDGMENT: A STUDY OF POLICY MAKING (NEW YORK: BASIC BOOKS, 1965). CRITICAL COMMENTARY HAS PROVED INVALUABLE. ROBERT MERTON HAS PROVIDED THE BEST (AND TOUGHEST) COMMENTS IT HAS EVER BEEN MY GOOD FORTUNE TO RECEIVE. GORDON WASSERMAN HELPED ME CUT OUT AS WELL A CKNOWLEDGMENTS VIII ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AS INCLUDE IN. HERMAN VAN GUNSTEREN, ELAINE SPITZ, AND PAUL SNEIDERMAN IMPROVED THE SECTIONS ON CITIZENSHIP AND TRUST. LEROY CRAYMER AND SEVERAL COMMENTATORS FOR LITTLE, BROWN GAVE ME A USEFUL TEACHING PERSPECTIVE. HARVARD WILLIAMSON HELPED IMPROVE MY EXPRESSION. I MEAN THIS BOOK TO BE WIDELY ACCESSIBLE, SO THAT SPECIAL THANKS ARE DUE TO MY CITIZEN CRITICS* JULIETTE DILLER AND JUDITH POLISAR. WILLIAM SIFFIN LABORED LONG FOR LITTLE, BROWN (BUT MORE FOR ME) TO BRING OUT THE POTENTIAL OF THIS VOLUME. I ALONE AM IRRESPONSIBLE. IX INTRODUCTION BY B. GUY PETERS XVII INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART XXXI PART I RESOURCES VERSUS OBJECTIVES 1 1 POLICY ANALYSIS IS WHAT INFORMATION SYSTEMS ARE NOT 7 MODERN MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS 8 THEORY 16 ORGANIZATION 18 HISTORY 20 2 STRATEGIC RETREAT ONOBJECTIVES: LEARNING FROMFAILURE INAMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 25 RETREAT ONOBJECTIVES 28 THE SEARCH FORATTAINABLE OBJECTIVES 34 RETREAT OR ROUT? 39 REDEFINING THEPROBLEM 43 C ONTENTS X CONTENTS 3 POLICY ASITS OWN CAUSE 51 THE LAW OFLARGE SOLUTIONS INPUBLIC POLICY 52 INTERNALIZING EXTERNAL EFFECTS 57 THE CORPORATE STATE? 61 GOVERNMENT ASAFEDERATION OFSECTORS 63 THE WORLD OUTSIDE 69 
992 |a CHANGE FORITS OWN SAKE 70 SECTORS OFPOLICY ASPROHIBITERS ANDPROPONENTS OFCHANGE 72 PROBLEMS ANDSOLUTIONS 74 4 COORDINATION WITHOUT ACOORDINATOR 79 THE REVOLUTION WEARE WAITING FORIS ALREADY HERE 80 RULES CONTAINING THECONSENSUS 81 RULES FORRESOLVING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT VALUES 84 PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS ASDETERMINANTS OFCOST 89 MISUNDERSTANDINGS THAT ALWAYS COST MORE 96 ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 98 PART II SOCIAL INTERACTION VERSUS INTELLECTUAL COGITATION 105 5 BETWEEN PLANNING ANDPOLITICS: INTELLECT VS. INTERACTION ASANALYSIS 111 EXCHANGE 114 MOTIVATION 116 PLANNING ANDPOLITICS 118 ANALYSIS 122 RATIONALITY 126 POLITICS ANDPLANNING ARE EQUALLY (IR) RATIONAL 127 THE IMPERATIVES 128 *RETROSPECTION* 134 REPRISE 139 6 A BIAS TOWARD FEDERALISM 143 THE COOPERATIVE-COERCIVE MODEL 144 THE CONFLICT-CONSENT MODEL 149 SIZE VS. NUMBER OR INTERACTION VS. COGITATION REVISITED 152 XI CONTENTS 7 OPPORTUNITY COSTS ANDMERIT WANTS 159 TWO DOCTRINES 160 COST VERSUSMERIT, OR INTERACTION ANDCOGITATION INA NEW GUISE 161 COST INECONOMICS 164 HISTORY 166 TEXTS INTHEPRIVATE SECTOR 168 FOUR CONCEPTS OFWORTH 169 OPPORTUNITY COST ANDMARKETS 173 COST INTHEPUBLIC SECTOR 178 ECONOMICS INTHEPUBLIC SECTOR: PUBLIC GOODS ANDMERIT WANTS 181 8 ECONOMY ANDENVIRONMENT RATIONALITY ANDRITUAL 193 THE DELAWARE RIVER BASIN PROJECT*S FAILURE 194 ALTERNATIVES FORCONTROLLING WATER POLLUTION 201 THE RISKY ENVIRONMENT 203 ECONOMICS FORENVIRONMENTALISTS 210 PART III DOGMA VERSUS SKEPTICISM 215 9 THE SELF-EVALUATING ORGANIZATION 223 EVALUATION 224 OBSTACLES TOEVALUATION 225 THE POLICY-ADMINISTRATION DICHOTOMY REVISITED 232 WHO WILL PAY THECOSTS OFCHANGE? 236 EVALUATION, INCORPORATED 239 ADJUSTING TOTHEENVIRONMENT 241 JOINING KNOWLEDGE WITHPOWER 244 EVALUATION ASTRUST 247 10 SKEPTICISM ANDDOGMA INTHEWHITE HOUSE: JIMMY CARTER*STHEORY OFGOVERNING 253 UNIFORMITY 255 PREDICTABILITY 256 COGITATION 256 COMPREHENSIVENESS 257 XII CONTENTS INCOMPATIBILITY 259 TOP-LIGHT ANDBOTTOM-HEAVY 261 BELIEF 262 *HE-THE-PEOPLE* 263 
992 |a 11 CITIZENS ASANALYSTS 269 CITIZENSHIP ASMORAL DEVELOPMENT 270 MR. ANDMRS. MODEL CITIZEN 273 A STRATEGY OFSPECIALIZATION 274 CITIZENSHIP INDAILY LIFE 277 DISTINGUISHING BIG FROMLITTLE CHANGE 281 PROD CHANGE 284 FACT ANDVALUE: CONVENTION OR CONSTRAINT? 289 WHY ANALYSIS IS CONSERVATIVE 294 MORALITY ANDPOLICY ANALYSIS 297 PART IV POLICY ANALYSIS 301 12 DOING BETTER ANDFEELING WORSE: THEPOLITICAL PATHOLOGY OFHEALTH POLICY 305 PARADOXES, PRINCIPLES, AXIOMS, IDENTITIES, ANDLAWS 306 WHY THERE IS ACRISIS? 311 DOES ANYONE WIN? 313 CURING THESICKNESS OFHEALTH 314 ALTERNATIVE HEALTH POLICIES 318 MARKET VERSUS ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS 319 THOUGHT ANDACTION 324 PLANNING HEALTHSYSTEM AGENCIES 325 THE FUTURE 330 13 LEARNING FROMEDUCATION: IF WE*RE STILL STUCK ONTHE PROBLEMS,MAYBE WE*RE TAKING THEWRONG EXAM 333 COMPENSATION WITHOUT EDUCATION 334 EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY WITHOUT SOCIAL EQUALITY 339 THE OBJECTIVE OFHAVING OBJECTIVES 341 XIII CONTENTS POLITICIZATION WITHOUT POLITICS 345 CLARIFICATION OFOBJECTIVES ASASOCIAL PROCESS 348 14 A TAX BY ANY OTHER NAME: THEDONOR- DIRECTED AUTOMATICPERCENTAGE-CONTRIBUTION BONUS, ABUDGET ALTERNATIVE FORFINANCING GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT OF CHARITY 353 BUDGET ALTERNATIVES 355 PROPOSALS, CRITERIA, ANDCONSEQUENCES 357 WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES AGOVERNMENT SUBSIDY MAKE? A SENSITIVITYANALYSIS 369 HOW MUCH OFWHICH PROBLEMS ARE WEPREPARED TOLIVE WITH? ANANALYSIS OFCRITERIA 371 POLITICAL FEASIBILITY 374 TESTING THEPERCENTAGE-CONTRIBUTION BONUS 377 15 DISTRIBUTION OFURBAN SERVICES 381 PATTERNS OFRESOURCE DISTRIBUTION 385 THREE PATTERNS: THEMORE, THEMORE; COMPENSATION; AND RESULTANTS 387 AN EXPLANATION 389 ADAM SMITH INACTION 391 JUDGING OUTCOMES 395 ALTERING OUTCOMES 402 16 ANALYSIS ASCRAFT 419 SOLUTIONS ASPROGRAMS 425 SOLUTIONS ASHYPOTHESES 428 SOLUTIONS ASSOCIAL ARTIFACTS 430 THE CRAFT OFPROBLEM SOLVING 433 SPEAKING TRUTH TOPOWER 437 APPENDIX: PRINCIPLES FORAGRADUATE SCHOOL OFPUBLIC POLICY 445 STRUCTURE OFTHESCHOOL 447 FACULTY 449 CURRICULUM 450 XIV CONTENT 
992 |a ADMINISTRATION 455 AFTERWORD 457 POSTSCRIPT: DOES EUROPE DIFFER? SOCIAL POLICY INSELECTED WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 459 WELFARE ANDSOCIAL SECURITY 460 HEALTH 467 EDUCATION 481 CRIME 486 CONCLUSION 492 CREDITS 497 INDEX 499 XV TABLE 4.1 SOCIAL-WELFARE EXPENDITURES; GROWTH OF SELECTED SOCIAL PROGRAMS,INCURRENT DOLLARS, REAL DOLLARS, AND AS A PERCENTAGE OFFEDERAL BUDGET OUTLAYS, 1965*1975 81 TABLE 4.2 SOCIAL-WELFARE EXPENDITURES, INCREASE IN CURRENT DOLLARS, 1965*1975(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 82 TABLE 4.3 SOCIAL-WELFARE EXPENDITURES, INCREASE IN REAL DOLLARS, 1965*1975(INMILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 82 TABLE 4.4 SOCIAL-WELFARE EXPENDITURES, INCREASE AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE FEDERALBUDGET, 1965*1975 83 TABLE 5.1 ALTERNATIVE STYLES OF POLICY ANALYSIS 121 TABLE 5.2 TABLE ADAPTED FROM STUDENT PAPER BY OWEN MCSHANE 129 TABLE 6.1 TWO MODELS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 145 TABLE 8.1 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF DECS POLLUTION PLANS 197 TABLE 14.1 FOR THE AMOUNT CONTRIBUTED TO CHARITY, HIGH-INCOME PERSONS RECEIVE A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF TAX EXPENDITURES 360 TABLE 14.2 THE TAX WRITE-OFF: THE RICH (1 PERCENT OF CONTRIBUTORS) PAY 5PERCENT OF THE PRIVATE COST ($0.5 BILLION), GIVE 14 PERCENT OFTHECHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS ($1.7 BILLION), BUT RECEIVE 39PERCENTOF THE WRITE-OFF ($1.3 BILLION) 364 TABLE 14.3 THE 35 PERCENT CONTRIBUTION BONUS: AN EQUITABLE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY MAINTAINS THE FLOW OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 365 TABLE 14.4 REPEAL OF THE TAX WRITE-OFF WITH A 100 PERCENT INCENTIVE EFFECTANDSUBSTITUTION OF THE PERCENTAGE-CONTRIBUTION BONUS WITH A 0 PERCENT INCENTIVE EFFECT MAINTAIN TOTAL FLOWS TO CHARITABLES 370 TABLE 14.5 HOW MUCH OF WHICH PROBLEMS ARE WE PREPARED TO LIVE WITH? ANANALYSIS OF CRITERIA 373 L IST OF T ABLES XVI LIST OF TABLES TABLE 15.1 THREE STANDARDS OF EQUITY FOR JUDGING OUTCOMES 401 TABLE 15.2 OUTCOMES IN OAKLAND 402 TABLE B.1 THE RAPID RISE IN WELFARE AND SOCIAL SECURITY TYPE SPENDING INSELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES, 1955*1970 463 
992 |a TABLE B.2 THE DECLINE IN DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP FOR SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 464 TABLE B.3 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 471 XVII FOR ME, AND I THINK ALSO FOR MANY OTHER STUDENTS OF PUBLIC POLICY, THERE ARE TWO SEMINAL FIGURES IN THIS FIELD OF INQUIRY. ONE IS HAROLD LASSWELL, AND THE OTHER IS AARON WILDAVSKY. IT IS THEREFORE A GREAT HONOR FOR ME TO BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE THIS INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW EDITION OF THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS , AND TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFLECT ON THE ROLE THAT THIS BOOK, AND AARON*S WORK MORE GENERALLY, HAS HAD ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES. WHILE A GREAT HONOR, THIS IS ALSO A GREAT CHALLENGE. THIS ONE BOOK CONTAINS NUMEROUS INSIGHTS INTO POLICY AND POLICYMAKING, AND THIS IS BUT ONE OF A NUMBER OF BOOKS AND ARTICLES THAT, ALTHOUGH PUB- LISHED SEPARATELY, AMOUNT TO A MORE OR LESS INTEGRATED CONCEPTION OF WHAT POLICY IS, AND WHAT POLICY SHOULD BE. THE INDIVIDUAL CHAPTERS IN THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS REP- RESENT SOMETHING OF THE BREADTH OF AARON WILDAVSKY*S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY. THESE CHAPTERS RANGE FROM CONSIDERATIONS OF GOVERNING UNDER PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER AND THE NATURE OF AMERICAN FED- ERALISM TO INSIGHTS INTO THE ROLES OF PLANNING AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS IN PUBLIC POLICY. THESE CHAPTERS ALSO INCLUDE DISCUSSIONS OF A RANGE OF SPECIFIC POLICY ISSUES SUCH AS HEALTH, 1 EDUCATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT. BUT PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY THESE CHAPTERS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY ASKING QUESTION ABOUT I NTRODUCTION B. GUYPETERS B. GUY PETERS ( * ) DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, PITTSBURGH, PA, USA XVIII INTRODUCTION HOW WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT PUBLIC POLICY AND HOW GOVERNMENTS (AND CITI- ZENS) CAN MARSHAL RESOURCES TO MAKE AND IMPLEMENT GOOD POLICY. ATTEMPTING TO CAPTURE THIS RICH ARRAY OF IDEAS AND INSIGHTS IN THIS ONE INTRODUCTORY ESSAY IS ESSENTIALLY IMPOSSIBLE, AND I AM SURE THAT I WILL NOT DO 
992 |a JUSTICE TO MANY OF THE IDEAS IN THE BOOK. THIS NECESSARY SELECTIVITY IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO OFFEND THE MANY FRIENDS AND STUDENTS OF THIS GREAT MAVEN IN THE FIELD. TO ATTEMPT TO COVER THESE ESSAYS, AND THE MANY OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS MADE DURING HIS LONG CAREER, I WILL PUT FORWARD A SERIES OF PROPOSITIONS THAT TO ME HELP TO CHARACTERIZE THESE ESSAYS. THESE IDEAS ALSO CAN INFORM OUR CONTEMPORARY THINKING ABOUT PUBLIC POLICY JUST AS THEY DID WHEN THIS BOOK WAS FIRST PUBLISHED OVER 40 YEARS AGO, BUT UNFORTUNATELY SOME OF THESE IDEAS ABOUT POLICY APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN LOST IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL LIFE. I.P OLICY A NALYSIS I S AN A RT OR A C RAFT A S M UCH A S I T I S A S CIENCE MUCH OF OUR CONTEMPORARY THINKING ABOUT POLICY ANALYSIS, AND ABOUT THE SOCIAL SCIENCES MORE GENERALLY, CHARACTERIZES THESE ACTIVITIES AS SCIENCE, AND AS A PARTICULAR TYPE OF SCIENCE. THE DISCIPLINE 2 TENDS TO EMPHASIZE DEVELOP- ING TESTABLE THEORIES AND HAVING HARD, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTH- ESES DERIVED FROM THOSE THEORIES. THIS STYLE OF POLICY ANALYSIS IS DOMINANT IN MANY, IF NOT MOST, SCHOOLS OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WE ARE PRODUCING NUMEROUS WELL-TRAINED POLICY ANALYSTS WHO CAN CRUNCH NUMBERS WITH GREAT PRECISION. 3 THAT *SCIENTIFIC*, OR AT LEAST TECHNOCRATIC, APPROACH TO POLICY ANALY- SIS CERTAINLY HAS ITS MERITS AND CAN PROVIDE VERY USEFUL INSIGHTS FOR POLI- CYMAKERS, BUT IF WE READ AARON WILDAVSKY*S WORK ON POLICY WE CAN SEE THAT THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE ARE NOT ALL THERE IS IN POLICY. PUBLIC POLICY IS ABOUT IDEAS AS MUCH OR MORE THAN IT IS ABOUT EQUATIONS. IN WILDAVSKY*S VERSION OF POLICY ANALYSIS EQUATIONS WOULD BE WELCOME* AS INDEED THEY WERE IN HIS ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL BUDGETING IN THE UNITED STATES*BUT ONLY IF THEY WERE ANCHORED IN IDEAS, AND PARTICULARLY IN IDEAS THAT WERE CONNECTED TO, AND FEASIBLE IN, THE REAL WORLD OF POLITICS. IN SOME ASPECTS OF HIS WORK WILDAVSKY APPROACHES A CONSTRUCTIVIST POSI- 
992 |a TION ON UNDERSTANDING POLICY (SEE BELAND, 2009). THAT IS, RATHER THAN BEING SOME OBJECTIVE REALITY POLICY IS CONSTRUCTED THROUGH THE INTERAC- TIONS OF ACTORS AND THROUGH DEVELOPED A COMMON FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT THE POLICY ISSUES. THUS, POLICY PROBLEMS AND THE DESIGN OF SOLUTION TO THOSE PROBLEMS MAY NOT BE OBJECTIVE BUT RATHER REFLECT THE POLITICAL AND XIX INTRODUCTION SOCIAL PROCESS THROUGH WHICH THEY ARE DEFINED AND PREPARED FOR RESOLUTION. A GOOD DEAL OF POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING, THEREFORE, IS ABOUT HOW WE CON- CEPTUALIZE THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING US. THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEAS AND THE NEED TO CONSTRUCT UNDERSTANDINGS OF POLICY LEADS NATURALLY ON TO THE TITLE OF THIS BOOK, AND ITS PRINCIPAL FOCUS* ART AND CRAFT IN POLICY ANALYSIS. THIS CHARACTERIZATION OF POLICY ANALYSIS CAN BE RELATED TO A CLASSIC ARGUMENT ABOUT DECISION-MAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS. PERROW (1970; SEE ALSO THOMPSON AND TUDEN, 1959) DISCUSSED DECISION - MAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS AS A CRAFT WHEN THE OUTCOMES OF A PROCESS ARE UNCERTAIN ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE RELATIVELY FEW EXCEPTIONS IN THE INPUTS. WHILE THAT DEFINITION IS NOT AS PRECISELY ON TARGET FOR POLICYMAKING AS WE MIGHT LIKE, IT DOES POINT TO THE NEED FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE POLI- CYMAKER, AND THAT THIS IS NOT JUST A MECHANICAL PROCESS OF CRANKING OUT AN ANSWER TO A PREDETERMINED PROBLEM. II.P OLICY A NALYSIS I S P OLITICAL WHILE THIS POINT SHOULD BE BLINDINGLY OBVIOUS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEM- BER THAT PUBLIC POLICY AND POLICY ANALYSIS ARE INHERENTLY POLITICAL. THERE IS SOME TENDENCY, AS IMPLIED ABOVE, TO MAKE POLICY ANALYSIS TECHNOCRATIC AND DIVORCED FROM THE PUSH AND PULL OF POLITICS. WHILE GOOD INFORMATION AND GOOD ANALYSIS IS IMPORTANT FOR MAKING GOOD POLICY, ALL THAT ANALYSIS IS USELESS IF THE PROPOSALS FORMULATED ARE INFEASIBLE AND CANNOT BE ADOPTED. THEREFORE, THE SUCCESSFUL ANALYST WILL HAVE HIS OR HER FEET FIRMLY PLANTED IN THE SHIFTING SANDS OF POLITICS. ACCEPTING THE UNCERTAINTY AND SEEMING 
992 |a IRRATIONALITY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS MERELY A NECESSITY FOR POLICYMAKERS AND ANALYSTS. AARON WILDAVSKY NEVER FORGOT THAT POLICYMAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION ARE POLITICAL; RATHER HE ALWAYS PUT THIS FUNDAMENTAL POINT AT THE CENTER OF HIS THINKING. THAT UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICS WAS NOT NECESSARILY PARTISAN, BUT MAY BE ORGANIZATIONAL OR EVEN PERSONAL. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (SEE BELOW) IS VERY MUCH ABOUT DEFENDING THE INTERESTS OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE INDIVIDUAL ACTORS INVOLVED ALSO ARE ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND THE TRUST OF THEIR ASSOCIATES. LIKEWISE, HIS CLASSIC STUDY OF IMPLEMENTATION (PRESSMAN AND WILDAVSKY, 1974) INVOLVED ACTORS AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT MAKING DECISIONS TO PROTECT THEIR INTER- ESTS OR PERHAPS SIMPLY TO SUPPORT OR OPPOSE A SPECIFIC POLICY AGENDA. THE ESSAY ON PLANNING AND POLITICS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME IS AN EXCEL- LENT EXPLICATION OF THE ROLE OF POLITICS, AS OPPOSED TO MORE (PRESUMABLY) XX INTRODUCTION RATIONAL METHODS OF POLICY ANALYSIS. THIS ESSAY IS NOT ONE OF HIS MORE FREQUENTLY CITED CONTRIBUTIONS, BUT IT DESCRIBES RATHER WELL THE CONTRAST BETWEEN *PUZZLING* AND *POWERING* (HECLO, 1974; HOPPE, 2010) IN POLICY ANALYSIS. THIS DISTINCTION REFLECTS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IMPORTANT FORMS OF POLICYMAKING AND POLICY ANALYSIS BASED ON COGITATION AND THOSE BASED MERELY ON POLITICAL INTERESTS AND POWER. WHILE HE REJECTS THE CLAIMS OF RATIONALITY IN BOTH POLITICS AND PLANNING, AND HENCE IN MODELS BASED ON INTERACTIONS AND INTELLECT, HE DOES DEMONSTRATE CLEARLY THE USES AND ABUSES OF EACH. WILDAVSKY*S WORK ON PUBLIC POLICY ALSO INVOLVES THE THIRD ELEMENT OF THE TRIAD DISCUSSED BY ROBERT HOPPE*PARTICIPATION. IN THIS ESSAY ON THE *CITIZEN AS ANALYST* CONTAINED IN THIS BOOK HE POINTS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INFORMED BODY OF CITIZENS CONSIDERING POSSIBLE POLICIES AND DOING THEIR OWN ANALYSIS. AND THAT ANALYSIS WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD ON TO THEIR PARTICIPA- 
992 |a TION IN THE POLICY PROCESS, IN WHATEVER MANNER WAS AVAILABLE FOR THEM TO DO SO. LIKEWISE, IN THE OTHER CHAPTERS CONTAINED HERE THERE IS A PERVASIVE SENSE THAT IN A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM ATTEMPTING TO DO POLICY WITHOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE PUBLIC IS A MISTAKE, AND LIKELY TO INCREASE THE ALREADY HIGH RISK OF MISTAKES. III.P OLICY A NALYSIS I S N ORMATIVE ALAN MELTSNER, A POLICY SCHOLAR WHO WAS A ROUGH CONTEMPORARY OF AARON WILDAVSKY, ONCE ARGUED (1975) THAT POLICY ANALYSTS WHO DID NOT HAVE THEIR OWN IDEAS ABOUT WHAT THEY WANTED IN A POLICY WERE ONLY *BABY ANALYSTS*. THAT IS, THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO PERFORM HIGH QUALITY TECHNICAL ANALYSES BUT WITHOUT A NORMATIVE FOUNDATION, AND SOME UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT *GOOD POLICY* WAS OTHER THAN IN A TECHNICAL SENSE THEY WERE NOT REALLY CONTRIB- UTING MUCH TO THE DEBATES OVER POLICY. WHILE THAT CHARACTERIZATION MAY APPEAR HARSH, IT DOES ARGUE FOR THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL VALUES IN MAKING AND ASSESSING POLICIES. SAYING A POLICY WILL *WORK* MAY BEG THE QUESTION OF FOR WHOM IT WORKS AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE. EVALUATION IS THE STAGE OF THE POLICY PROCESS WHERE VALUES BECOME MOST IMPORTANT (SEE WILDAVSKY*S CHAPTER ON EVALUATION IN THIS VOLUME). IF WE ARE TO EVALUATE A POLICY WE COMPARE THE RESULTS OF THE PROGRAMS INVOLVED WITH THE GOALS OF THE PROGRAM, TO SEE TO WHAT EXTENT THOSE GOALS WERE ACHIEVED. AN EVALUATION MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROGRAMS BEING CONSIDERED, AND THE OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF THE USE OF SCARCE RESOURCES FOR THIS POLICY RATHER THAN FOR OTHERS. BUT POLICY EVALUATION XXI INTRODUCTION SHOULD GO BEYOND THOSE ASSESSMENTS, AS IMPORTANT AS THEY ARE. EVALUATION OF POLICIES INVOLVES CONSIDERING THE GOALS OF POLICY, AND THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THOSE GOALS AS WELL AS SPECIFIC POLICY GOALS, POLICY ANALYSIS ALSO INVOLVES BROADER SOCIAL GOALS. LATE IN HIS CAREER AARON WILDAVSKY BECAME INTERESTED IN CULTURAL THEORY, ESPECIALLY THE WORK OF THE ANTHROPOLOGIST MARY DOUGLAS (SEE 
992 |a WILDAVSKY, 1987). IN PARTICULAR HE WAS INTERESTED IN HOW PEOPLE DEVELOPED PREFERENCES FOR POLICIES. RATHER THAN ASSUMING THAT PREFERENCES DEVELOPED FROM RATIONAL CALCULATIONS OF SELF-INTEREST, HE SOUGHT THE ROOTS OF PREFER- ENCES IN POLITICAL CULTURE. WHILE POLITICAL CULTURE HAS BECOME EXTREMELY UNFASHIONABLE IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS AARON WILDAVSKY DEMONSTRATED THE RELEVANCE OF BROAD CULTURAL PATTERNS TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY. 4 IN SUMMARY, IDEAS AND CULTURE ARE CENTRAL TO POLICY, BUT THESE ARE PER- HAPS MORE DIFFICULT TO INCLUDE IN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICY THAN ARE *HARD* ECONOMIC FACTS. BUT THE DIFFICULTIES IN MEASUREMENT DOES NOT UNDERMINE THE UTILITY OF THE CONCEPTS FOR UNDERSTANDING HOW GOVERNMENTS WORK AND HOW POLICY IS MADE AND IMPLEMENTED. IV.P OLICYMAKING I S I NSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONS ARE ANOTHER FACTOR THAT IS CENTRAL TO AARON WILDAVSKY*S UNDER- STANDING OF PUBLIC POLICY. AS WELL AS BEING A STUDENT OF POLICY, HE WAS A STUDENT OF AT LEAST TWO IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT-THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE PRESIDENCY. AND SEVERAL OF THE CHAPTERS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME DEMONSTRATE THAT CONCERN WITH THE INFLUENCE OF THOSE INSTI- TUTIONS ON POLICY, PERHAPS MOST CLEARLY THE CHAPTER ON THE CARTER PRESI- DENCY AND THE DISCUSSION OF THE SELF-EVALUATING ORGANIZATION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. BUT AARON WILDAVSKY*S APPRECIATION OF THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN POLICY ANALYSIS IS NOT CONFINED TO THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE PRESIDENCY. HIS LARGE CORPUS OF SCHOLARLY WORK ON POLICY IS FILLED WITH INSIGHTS INTO INSTITUTIONS AND THE WAY IN WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL INSTITUTIONS (OR ORGANIZATIONS) AND THEIR INTERACTION. AND THE LOGIC OF HIS THINKING ABOUT POLICY CAN BE SEEN CLEARLY THROUGH AN INSTITUTIONALIST LENS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NOTION OF CLEAR- ANCE POINTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION BOOK IS A PRECURSOR TO THE IDEA OF VETO POINTS AND VETO PLAYERS THAT HAS BEEN IMPORTANT IN RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPEC- TIVES ON INSTITUTIONS (TSEBELIS, 2002). 
992 |a IN THIS VIEW OF GOVERNING ALL THE ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH POLICYMAKING ARE EMBEDDED IN INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS BROADLY DEFINED. XXII INTRODUCTION INDIVIDUALS ARE IMPORTANT ACTORS BUT THEY GAIN MUCH OF THEIR IMPORTANCE FOR POLICY THROUGH INTERACTING WITH OTHER INDIVIDUALS WITHIN INSTITUTIONS. IN THESE INTERACTIONS VALUES SUCH AS TRUST AMONG INDIVIDUALS AND THE PRE- DICTABILITY OF THEIR BEHAVIOR, ENABLE DECISION-MAKING TO OCCUR IN WAYS THAT MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE WITH MORE ATOMISTIC INDIVIDUALS. THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS CAN BE SEEN IN WILDAVSKY*S COMPARA- TIVE WORK. WHILE CLEARLY DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THINKING ABOUT POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, AARON WILDAVSKY ALSO ACCEPTED AND PROMOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT IN UNDERSTANDING GOVERNMENT AND POLICY (SEE POLLITT, 2013). HIS COMPARATIVE DISCUSSIONS OF BUDGETING IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHILE DEMONSTRATING SOME IMPORTANT SIMILARITIES, ALSO DEMONSTRATED THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES. AND HIS WORK ON BUDGETING AND PLANNING IN POOR COUNTRIES, MOSTLY DONE WITH NAOMI CAIDEN, EMPHASIZED THE ROLE OF CONTEXT AND THE FOLLY OF IMPOS- ING MODELS DEVELOPED FOR MORE AFFLUENT COUNTRIES IN THESE SITUATIONS. V.P ROBLEMS A RE N OT S OLVED , ONLY A MELIORATED (A T B EST ) A GOOD DEAL OF THE LITERATURE ON POLICYMAKING IS DIRECTED TOWARD DESIGNING INTERVENTIONS INTO THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY THAT WILL *SOLVE* A PROBLEM (SEE HOWLETT AND LEJANO, 2013). COMING UP WITH A SOLUTION IS A LOGIC GOAL, SEEMINGLY, FOR MAKING PUBLIC POLICY. FURTHER, IN THE REAL WORLD OF MAKING POLICIES IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, ADVOCATES OF A POLICY MUST PROMISE THAT THEY WILL SOLVE THE PROBLEM, AND INDEED OFTEN MUST PROMISE BENEFITS THAT EVEN THEY ARE AWARE ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED. THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS NOT KIND TO THOSE WHO PROMISE ONLY TO MAYBE MAKE THINGS A LITTLE BETTER. AND PERHAPS THIS CONVICTION ABOUT THE CAPACITY OF A POLICY TO ALTER IN A PREDICT- 
992 |a ABLE WAY ITS TARGET IS CRUCIAL FOR BUILDING ENTHUSIASM ABOUT THE PROGRAM. BUT MOST POLICIES DO NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM FOR ONCE AND FOR ALL. AND IF THEY DO THEN THE PROBLEM ADDRESSED PROBABLY WAS NOT REALLY A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE SOCIETY. EVEN AN INTERVENTION THAT APPEARS RELATIVELY EASY TO MAKE, SUCH AS BUILDING A ROAD FROM POINT A TO POINT B WILL NOT SOLVE THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM OF TRAFFIC CONGESTION, AND MANY STUDIES HAVE DEMON- STRATED THAT BUILDING A NEW ROAD SIMPLY PROVIDES MORE SPACE FOR MORE CARS AND CONGESTION IS LARGELY UNCHANGED. GIVEN THE COMPLEXITY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, AND THE RATHER INADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HOW TO INTERVENE AND WITH WHICH INSTRUMENTS, POLICYMAKING IS AN ONGOING STRUG- GLE TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE. XXIII INTRODUCTION THIS STRUGGLE FOR AMELIORATION IS HIGHLIGHTED IN WILDAVSKY*S ESSAY ON HEALTH POLICY CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME. THE CHALLENGE FACING HEALTH POLICY- MAKERS IS THAT THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH, ALTHOUGH IN REALITY WHAT IS DELIVERED ARE MEDICAL INTERVENTIONS RATHER THAN HEALTH PER SE, IS LARGELY INSATIABLE. FOR HEALTH POLICYMAKERS THE PROBLEM IS EXACERBATED BECAUSE MARGINAL IMPROVEMENTS IN HEALTH BECOME MORE COSTLY THE HEALTHIER AN INDIVIDUAL, OR A POPULATION, BECOMES. GIVEN THE LONGEVITY AND GENERALLY GOOD HEALTH STATUS OF POPULATIONS IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD, ADDING A SINGLE MONTH TO LIFE EXPECTANCY MAY BE DIFFICULT AND COSTLY. AND THEREFORE, SINCE FEW NEW APPARENT BENEFITS ARE DELIVERED, HEALTH POLICY CAN APPEAR TO BE A FAILURE. ANY NUMBER OF SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT POLI- CYMAKING IS MORE CONTINUOUS THAN DISCREET, BUT WILDAVSKY WENT ONE STEP FURTHER AND ARGUED THAT POLICY WAS ITS OWN CAUSE (CHAPTER X, THIS VOLUME). HIS* LAW OF LARGE SOLUTIONS* WAS THAT ANY LARGE-SCALE INTERVENTION WOULD TRANSFORM THE ENVIRONMENT AND CREATE THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL POLICIES, WHICH MAY ALSO PRODUCE MORE POLICIES, AD INFINITUM . THIS IS A RECOGNITION 
992 |a OF THE PROBLEM OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF MOST HUMAN INTERVENTIONS INTO SOCIETY (SEE MERTON, 1936), BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE DYNAMICS IN THOSE SYSTEMS. IT IS ALSO A RECOGNITION OF THE *TIRELESS TINKERING* THAT GOVERNMENTS ARE ENGAGED IN ATTEMPTING TO GET POLICY RIGHT (CARTER, 2012), AND IN ATTEMPTING TO SATISFY THE DEMANDS OF CITIZENS. THIS ESSAY ON POLICY AS ITS OWN CAUSE ALSO ADDRESSES ONE OF THE OTHER PERSISTENT PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC POLICY*THE SEGMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT AND THE NEED FOR COORDINATION (SEE PETERS, 2015). NOT ONLY DOES THE CRE- ATION OF A NEW POLICY UPSET EXISTING CONDITIONS IN ONE POLICY DOMAIN, IT CAN HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG POLICIES, REQUIRING FURTHER ADJUSTMENT AND ATTEMPTS TO GET PROGRAMS TO WORK TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE GIVEN THE ORGANIZATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERN- MENT, AND THE POLITICAL AND POLICY ARRANGEMENTS THAT EXIST AMONG THESE ACTORS. UNALIKE MANY STUDENTS OF COORDINATION WITHIN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, HOW- EVER, WILDAVSKY DOES NOT ASSUME THAT THE COORDINATION REQUIRED AMONG PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS WILL NECESSARILY COME ABOUT THROUGH HIERARCHY. 5 IF WE EXAMINE ATTEMPTS OF THE PUBLIC SECTORS IN VARIOUS COUN- TRIES AROUND THE WORLD TO CREATE MORE *JOINED UP* GOVERNMENT (POLLITT, 2003) THEY USUALLY RELY UPON THE CREATION OF MORE AUTHORITATIVE INSTITU- TIONS OR PROCEDURES. BUT COORDINATION CAN ALSO BE ACHIEVED THROUGH MORE COLLABORATIVE AND COOPERATIVE MEANS, BEGINNING AT THE BOTTOM RATHER THAN AT THE TOP OF GOVERNMENT. XXIV INTRODUCTION FINALLY, THE EMPHASIS ON AMELIORATION AND THE CONTINUOUS NEED TO MAKE AND REVISE POLICIES IS MANIFESTED IN THE DISCUSSION OF LEARNING, AND ESPE- CIALLY LEARNING FROM FAILURES. IF WE CONCEPTUALIZE MOST POLICYMAKING AS IN ESSENCE A SET OF EXPERIMENTS MADE BY GOVERNMENTS WITH OFTEN INADEQUATE INFORMATION (CAMPBELL, 1998), THEN LEARNING FROM FAILURES IS PERHAPS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TOOLS IN THE TOOL CHEST OF POLICY ANALYSTS. WHILE 
992 |a POLITICALLY IT IS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT FAILURE, FOR THE ANALYST IT MAY ONLY BE ONE MORE STEP ALONG THE ROAD TO MAKING A BETTER POLICY. VI.T HE P OLICY A NALYST M UST B E A S KEPTIC THE WORLD OF PUBLIC POLICY IS FILLED WITH ENTHUSIASTS. EVERY POLITICIAN OR INTER- EST GROUP WILL HAVE A PET PROJECT THAT THEY WILL SAVE THE WORLD, OR AT LEAST A LARGE PART OF IT. AS ALREADY NOTED THIS TENDENCY TO OVERSELL POLICIES IS A STRUC- TURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE NEED TO PERSUADE OTHER ACTORS OR THE PUBLIC. BUT IT IS ALSO A PRODUCT OF GENUINE COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF INDIVIDUALS WHO BELIEVE VERY DEEPLY ABOUT AN ISSUE AND ALSO BELIEVE VERY DEEPLY THAT THEY HAVE A SOLUTION, OR MORE PRECISELY THE SOLUTION, FOR THAT ISSUE. 6 THESE COMMITMENTS MAY DRIVE GOOD POLICIES FORWARD, BUT THEY CAN ALSO PROPEL LESS WORTHY POLICIES ONTO THE AGENDAS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND EVENTUALLY INTO ACTUAL OPERATION. INTO THIS WORLD OF ENTHUSIASM THE TASK OF THE POLICY ANALYST IS TO BRING SOME SKEPTICISM AND SOME RESTRAINT. THIS IS NOT JUST SKEPTICISM FOR ITS OWN SAKE, BUT AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THOSE ENTHUSIASTS TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE EFFECTS, INTENDED AND UNINTENDED OF THEIR POLICY IDEAS, AND ALSO TO CON- SIDER THE COSTS. THE TASK OF THE POLICY ANALYST IS TO *SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER*, WHICH WAS THE TITLE OF THE AMERICAN VERSION OF THIS BOOK. THIS COMMIT- MENT TO USING THE TOOLS OF POLICY ANALYSIS TO BRING A GREATER SENSE OF REALITY, AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF RISK, IS CENTRAL TO THE CONTRIBUTIONS THAT AARON WILDAVSKY MADE TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY. THE NOTION OF POLICY AS ITS OWN CAUSE, AND HIS NUMEROUS WRITINGS ON BUDGET REFORM ATTEMPTS IN THE UNITED STATES (SEE WILDAVSKY, 1978), DEMONSTRATE SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE CAPACITY OF REFORMERS TO REFORM EFFECTIVELY. THIS PERSPECTIVE CAN BE RELATED NOT ONLY TO HIS OBSERVATIONS OF NUMEROUS REFORMS THAT WERE LESS THAN FULLY SUCCESSFUL, BUT ALSO TO HIS INSTI- TUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE. THAT IS, THERE IS AN ARGUMENT, OFTEN MORE IMPLICIT 
992 |a THAN EXPLICIT, THAT INSTITUTIONS*MEANING ALSO FORMALIZED PROCEDURES SUCH AS IN BUDGETING*THAT HAVE GROWN UP OVER TIME ARE MORE CAPABLE OF PRO- DUCING EFFECTIVE OUTCOMES THAT ARE MECHANISMS THAT ARE LESS CLEARLY DEFINED AND DEVELOPED ON AN AD HOC OR PRESUMABLY MORE OBJECTIVELY RATIONAL BASIS. XXV INTRODUCTION THE COMMITMENT TO REALISM, AND SKEPTICISM, WHEN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE POLICY INTERVENTIONS CAN BE SEEN CLEARLY IN THE SEVERAL CHAPTERS ON SPE- CIFIC POLICY AREAS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME. AS ALREADY NOTED THE CHAPTER ON HEALTH POLICY DEMONSTRATES THE MANY CONUNDRUMS WHICH HEALTH POLICY ANALYSTS CONFRONT*SOMETHING THAT IS ALL TOO EVIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2017. LIKEWISE, THE CHAPTERS ON EDUCATION AND ON URBAN SERVICES POINT TO THE NEED FOR CLEAR, ANALYTIC THINKING IN POLICY AREAS THAT ARE OFTEN DOMI- NATED BY IDEOLOGY AND UNEXAMINED COMMITMENTS TO PARTICULAR DOGMAS. AND THE CHAPTER OF ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF FUNDING CHARITIES BUILDS ON HIS SKEP- TICISM ABOUT THE COMMON USE OF TAX EXPENDITURES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PUB- LIC SPENDING (WILDAVSKY, 1985). IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SKEPTICISM AND CAUTION ABOUT POLICY EXPRESSED IN AARON WILDAVSKY*S WORK IS BY NO MEANS NIHILISM OR SIMPLY BEING NEGATIVE ABOUT THE ATTEMPTS OF OTHERS TO IMPROVE THE PERFOR- MANCE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR. TO SOME EXTENT IT APPEARS TO BE THE OPPOSITE. THE CONCERN WITH PUBLIC POLICY EXPRESSED IN THIS BOOK, AND IN WILDAVSKY*S OTHER WORK, DEMONSTRATES THE INTEREST IN MAKING THE WORLD IN GENERAL AND THE UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR A BETTER PLACE THROUGH PUBLIC ACTION. BUT THOSE GOALS OF IMPROVEMENT CANNOT BE REACHED SIMPLY BY ACCEPTING EVERY IDEA THAT IS ADVANCED. RATHER, THOSE GOALS WILL ONLY BE REACHED BY DELIB- ERATE ACTION AND CAREFUL DESIGN OF POLICIES, WHILE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PROBABILITIES OF SUCCESS ARE FAR FROM ONE HUNDRED PERCENT. VI.B UDGETING I S C RUCIAL FOR P OLICY , AND P OLITICS ALTHOUGH NOT AS EVIDENT IN THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS AS IN MUCH 
992 |a OF HIS OTHER WORK, THE PUBLIC BUDGET IS CENTRAL TO AARON WILDAVSKY*S CON- TRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS, AND ESPECIALLY TO THINKING ABOUT THE POLITICS OF POLICY. THIS IS ALSO ONE OF THE RELATIVELY FEW AREAS OF HIS WORK THAT WOULD FIT INTO THE CONTEMPORARY EMPHASIS ON QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS. HIS WORK ON BUDGET MODELS (DAVIS ETAL., 1966; WILDAVSKY, 1984) PROVIDED INSIGHTS INTO THE INCREMENTAL NATURE OF PUBLIC BUDGETING AND SPARKED A LARGE NUMBER OF ELABORATIONS 7 AND ATTEMPTED REFUTATIONS OF THE APPROACH. BUT HIS QUANTITATIVE WORK ON THE BUDGET WAS PERHAPS OVERSHADOWED BY HIS QUALITATIVE WORK. HIS POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1964 AND A NUMBER OF LATER EDITIONS) PROVIDED AN INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL EXPLANA- TION OF WHY THE OUTCOMES OF THE PROCESS WERE INCREMENTAL, AND SEEMINGLY IRRATIONAL. BUT WHEN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TASK IN MAKING A NATIONAL BUD- GET INVOLVED IS CONSIDERED, THEN USING SHORTCUTS AND RULES OF THUMB THAT XXVI INTRODUCTION MINIMIZE DECISION-MAKING COSTS MAY INDEED BE THE MOST RATIONAL WAY TO PROCEED. FURTHER, THE REPETITIVE NATURE OF THE PROCESS ENABLES ANY ERRORS MADE IN ONE YEAR TO BE CORRECTED IN FOLLOWING YEARS. THIS UNDERSTANDING OF BUDGETING ALSO EMPHASIZED THE INSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF THE PROCESS, AND ESPECIALLY THE INSTITUTIONALIZED PATTERNS OF INTERACTIONS AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS. HIS OTHER MAJOR QUALITATIVE WORK ON BUDGETING* THE PRIVATE GOVERNMENT OF PUBLIC MONEY (1974) , WITH HUGH HECLO*FURTHER ELABORATED HIS APPROACH TO BUDGETS AND THE POLITICS INVOLVED IN MAKING THE THOUSANDS OF DECISIONS CONTAINED WITHIN ANY BUDGET (HECLO AND WILDAVSKY, 1974). THIS BOOK REMAINS PROBABLY THE BEST SINGLE EXPOSITION OF THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPENDING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, EVEN AFTER DECADES OF CHANGE AND APPARENT REVOLUTION IN WHITEHALL (SEE PARRY, 2003). AND ALTHOUGH FUNC- TIONING WITHIN A SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT SET OF INSTITUTIONS THE BUDGETARY PROCESS IN LONDON DEMONSTRATED SOME OF THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS FOUND 
992 |a IN THE EARLIER STUDY OF BUDGETING IN WASHINGTON. IT IS EXTREMELY UNFORTUNATE THAT CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLICY ANALYSIS HAS LARGELY ABANDONED THIS INTEREST IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS. 8 SOME OF WILDAVSKY*S NUMEROUS STUDENTS FOLLOWED IN HIS FOOTSTEPS AND FOCUSED ON THE BUDGET, BUT MANY OF THESE SCHOLARS HAVE RETIRED OR MOVED ON TO OTHER INTERESTS. THE BUDGET REMAINS THE BEST SINGLE STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT PRI- ORITIES AVAILABLE, AND HAS THE VIRTUE OF BEING PROVIDING A READY-MADE RATIO LEVEL DEPENDENT VARIABLE, BUT YET WE LOOK AT IT ALL TOO INFREQUENTLY. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO ARGUE AGAINST THE PROPOSITION THAT APPROPRIATIONS AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ARE ONLY THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS TO PRODUCE POLICY OUT- COMES FOR CITIZENS, THEY REMAIN CRUCIAL STARTING POINTS. S UMMARY AND C ONCLUSIONS AS I SAID AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS ESSAY AARON WILDAVSKY IS, IN MY ESTI- MATION, ONE OF THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT FIGURES IN PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES. UNFORTUNATELY THOSE CONTRIBUTIONS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE RECOGNIZED ADE- QUATELY BY NEWER GENERATIONS OF POLICY SCHOLARS WHO MAY NOW SIMPLY TAKE HIS CONTRIBUTIONS AS GIVENS, AND AS PART OF THE GENERAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PUBLIC POLICY THAT WE ALL SHARE. I DO HOPE THAT THE REPUBLICATION OF THIS BOOK, AND THIS INTRODUCTORY ESSAY, CAN HELP RETURN WILDAVSKY*S IMMENSE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MAINSTREAM OF THINKING ABOUT PUBLIC POLICY. THE HOPE IS THAT REISSUING THIS BOOK WILL NOT JUST TO HONOR THE MAN, BUT ALSO HELP TO BRING HIS WAY OF THINKING ABOUT PUBLIC POLICY MORE CLEARLY XXVII INTRODUCTION INTO FOCUS AS WE THINK ABOUT CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES. THE SEVERAL DIMENSIONS OF HIS CONTRIBUTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE ALL HAVE GREAT RELEVANCE FOR POLICYMAKING IN THE PRESENT TIME, BUT ALSO MAY HAVE TO BE RECONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING. AARON WILDAVSKY WAS WRITING IN A VERY DIFFERENT POLITICAL CLIMATE, WITH DIFFERENT TYPES OF POLICY CHALLENGES, SO PERHAPS WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT WHAT HAS 
992 |a CHANGED AS WELL AS WHAT PERSISTS. FIRST, MUCH OF WILDAVSKY*S CAREER WAS DURING A PERIOD OF GREATER OPTI- MISM ABOUT THE CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENT TO GOVERN AND TO MAKE EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS INTO THE SOCIETY. THAT OPTIMISM HAS WANED ALMOST EVERY- WHERE, AND LARGELY VANISHED IN SOME QUARTERS. BEHIND HIS ADVICE OF CAUTION FOR POLICY ENTHUSIASTS THERE WAS ALWAYS A STRONG SENSE OF HOPE ABOUT THE CAPACITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR TO MAKE THE LIVES OF CITIZENS BETTER. DESPITE THE EVIDENCE OF SUCCESS OF SOME EVEN HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL PROGRAMS, THAT HOPE WOULD BE SEEN AS HOPELESSLY NAIVE BY MANY ON GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. SECOND, DURING THAT TIME POLITICS WAS SEEN AT TIMES AS THE COUNTERPOINT TO TECHNICAL ANALYSIS, AND THAT THE TECHNICAL MIGHT DOMINATE. POLITICS HAS BECOME DOMINANT, AND INDEED EXCESSIVELY DOMINANT, IN POLICYMAKING IN THE UNITED STATES AND TO A LESSER EXTENT ELSEWHERE. IT IS DOMINANT TO THE EXTENT THAT RATHER THAN WORRYING ABOUT THE DOMINANCE OF TECHNICAL SOLU- TIONS THERE IS A REAL NEED TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS SOME ATTENTION TO THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE IN POLICY AREAS SUCH AS CLIMATE CHANGE AND HEALTH CARE (ROGOWSKI, 2013; GRAHAM, 2017). IN AN ERA IN WHICH POLICY SCIENTISTS ARE TALKING ABOUT EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, THE REALITY OF POLICYMAKING APPEARS TO BE *POLICY-BASED EVIDENCE MAKING*. A THIRD POINT THAT DISTINGUISHES AARON WILDAVSKY*S WORK FROM CONTEM- PORARY POLICYMAKING, ESPECIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES, IS THE COMMITMENT TO INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. THE CONTEMPORARY DEMEANING OF INSTITUTIONS, WHETHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE, GOES HAND IN HAND WITH THE DEMEANING OF EXPERTISE, FOR AARON WILDAVSKY INSTITUTIONS WERE CRUCIAL FOR CREATING SOME PREDICTABILITY IN THE MIDST OF WHAT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE EXTREME UNCERTAINTY. AND, AS HE HAS DEMONSTRATED WITH THE WORK ON THE BUDGETARY PROCESS, THOSE INSTITUTIONALIZED PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR MAY ENABLE DECISION-MAKING WHEN FACED WITH SEEMINGLY OVERWHELMING TASKS. 9 
992 |a DESPITE THE APPARENT DIFFERENCES OF AARON WILDAVSKY*S WORK FROM THE CONTEMPORARY ZEITGEIST OF POLITICS, HIS APPROACH TO POLICY REMAINS REL- EVANT AND PERHAPS NEEDED MORE THAN EVER. HIS EMPHASIS ON THE VALUES INVOLVED IN PUBLIC POLICIES, AND HIS CONCERN WITH THE NEED TO BUILD POLITICAL XXVIII INTRODUCTION UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE NATURE OF POLICY, ARE ALL IMPORTANT FOR MAKING POL- ICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, JUST AS THEY WERE AT THE TIME HE WAS WRITING. AND PERHAPS MORE THAN ANYTHING THE UNDERLYING NOTION THAT PUBLIC POLICY CAN WORK AND CAN MAKE THE LIVES OF CITIZENS IS CRUCIAL FOR THE CURRENT AGE. R EFERENCES BELAND, D. (2009) IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY CHANGE, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY 16: 701*718. CAMPBELL, D.T. (1998) THE EXPERIMENTING SOCIETY, IN W.N.DUNN, ED., THE EXPERIMENTING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DONALD T, CAMPBELL (NEW BRUNSWICK, NJ: TRANSACTION PUBLISHERS). CARTER, P. (2012) POLICY AS PALIMPSEST, POLITICS AND POLICY . CHISHOLM, D. (1989). COORDINATION WITHOUT HIERARCHY: INFORMAL STRUCTURES IN MULTIORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS (BERKELEY: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS). DAVIS, O.A., M.A.H. DEMPSTER AND A. WILDAVSKY (1966) A THEORY OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 60, 529*557. GRAHAM, D.A. (2017) WHY THE CBO SCARES TRUMP?, THE ATLANTIC , MARCH 14. HTTPS://WWW.THEATLANTIC.COM/POLITICS/ARCHIVE/2017/03/TRUMPS- WAR- ON-INDEPENDENT-ANALYSIS/519468/?UTM_SOURCE=NL-ATLANTIC- DAILY-031417)%20BUT HECLO, H. (1974) MODERN SOCIAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN (NEW HAVEN, CT: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS). HECLO, H. AND A. WILDAVSKY (1974) THE PRIVATE GOVERNMENT OF PUBLIC MONEY COMMUNITY AND POLICY INSIDE BRITISH POLITICS (BERKELEY: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS). HOPPE, ROBERT (2010) THE GOVERNANCE OF PROBLEMS: PUZZLING, POWERING, AND PARTICIPATION (BRISTOL: POLICY PRESS). HOWLETT, M. AND R.P.LEJANO (2013) TALES FROM THE CRYPT: THE RISE AND FALL (AND REBIRTH?) OF POLICY DESIGN, ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY 45(3): 357*381. 
992 |a MARCH, J.G. AND J.P.OLSEN (1989) REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS (NEW YORK: THE FREE PRESS). MELTSNER, A.J. (1975) POLICY ANALYSIS IN THE BUREAUCRACY (BERKELEY: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS). MERTON, R.K. (1936) UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF PURPOSIVE SOCIAL ACTION, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 1, 894*904. XXIX INTRODUCTION PARRY, R. (2003) THE INFLUENCE OF HECLO AND WILDAVSKY*S THE PRIVATE GOVERNMENT OF PUBLIC MONEY, PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 18: 3*19. PERROW, C. (1970) ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL VIEW (LONDON: TAVISTOCK). PETERS, B.G. (2015) PURSUING HORIZONTAL MANAGEMENT: THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SECTOR COORDINATION (LAWRENCE: UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KANSAS). POLLITT, C. (2003) JOINED UP GOVERNMENT: A SURVEY, POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW 1, 34*49. POLLITT, C. (2013) CONTEXT IN PUBLIC POLICY AND MANAGEMENT: THE MISSING LINK (CHELTENHAM: EDWARD ELGAR). PRESSMAN, J.L. AND A. WILDAVSKY (1974) IMPLEMENTATION (BERKELEY: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS). ROGOWSKI, R. (2013) SHOOTING (OR IGNORING) THE MESSENGER, POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW 11, 216*221. THOMPSON, J.D. AND A. TUDEN (1959) STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, IN COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION (PITTSBURGH: UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES CENTER). TSEBELIS, G. (2002) VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK (PRINCETON, NJ: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS). WILDAVSKY, A. (1964) THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PRESS (BOSTON: LITTLE, BROWN). WILDAVSKY, A. (1978) A BUDGET FOR ALL SEASONS?: WHY THE TRADITIONAL BUDGET LAST, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 38, 501*509. WILDAVSKY, A. (1984) BUDGETING: A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS , 2ND ED. (NEW BRUNSWICK, NJ: TRANSACTION). WILDAVSKY, A. (1985) KEEPING KOSHER: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TAX EXPENDITURES, JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY 5, 413*432. WILDAVSKY, A. (1987) CHOOSING PREFERENCES BY CONSTRUCTING INSTITUTIONS: A CULTURAL THEORY OF PREFERENCE FORMATION, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 81, 3*21. N OTES 
992 |a 1. HIS ESSAY ON HEALTH POLICY REMAINS USEFUL AND INSIGHTFUL EVEN AFTER DECADES OF CHANGE IN HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES. I STILL INCLUDE IT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF READINGS FOR MY UNDERGRADUATE CLASS IN HEALTH POLICY. 2. I AM REFERRING TO POLICY ANALYSIS, OR POLICY SCIENCE, AS A DISCIPLINE HERE. IT COULD, HOWEVER, BE UNDERSTOOD EQUALLY WELL AS THE INTERSECTION OF A NUMBER XXX INTRODUCTION OF MORE CONVENTIONAL DISCIPLINES*ECONOMICS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, LAW, AND NUMEROUS SUBSTANTIVE AREAS SUCH AS ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE*ALL WORKING ON POLICY PROBLEMS. 3. THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE RECOUNTING TWO EXERCISES IN POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE SAME PROGRAM. ONE UTILIZED THE FULL ARMAMENTARIUM OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND CONCLUDED THAT THE PROGRAM WAS A FAILURE. THE OTHER, CONDUCTED BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY AT BERKELEY, WILDAVSKY*S OWN INSTI- TUTION, AND FOCUSING MORE ON PERCEPTIONS AND *SOFTER* CRITERIA DECLARED THE PROGRAM A SUCCESS. 4. IN THE TERMS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM PREFERENCES WERE ARGUED TO BE A FUNCTION OF A LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS RATHER THAN A LOGIC OF CONSEQUENTIALITY (MARCH AND OLSEN, 1989). 5. DONALD CHISHOLM*S BOOK ON NON-HIERARCHICAL COORDINATION (1989) CAME OUT OF THE SAME OAKLAND PROJECT THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION BOOK DID, AND WAS DIRECTLY INFLUENCED BY WILDAVSKY AND THIS CONCEPTIONS OF POLICY AND POLICYMAKING. 6. ALTHOUGH FOR THOSE OF US WHO HAVE BEEN DOING PUBLIC POLICY FOR SOME DECADES THIS PHRASE IS ASSOCIATED WITH AARON WILDAVSKY, THE ORIGINAL USE WAS BY THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS (QUAKERS) IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. 7. AS A GRADUATE STUDENT I REGULARLY TROOPED THROUGH THE SNOW IN EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN CARRYING BOXES OF IBM CARDS TO THE COMPUTER CENTER, ALL TO TEST THE DAVIS, DEMPSTER AND WILDAVSKY MODELS FOR THE STATE BUDGET. TRYING TO EXPLAIN TO MY CURRENT GRADUATE STUDENTS THE IDEA OF USING CARDS, AND THAT ONE COULD ONLY GET ONE RUN OF THE DATA EACH DAY, IS SOMEWHAT LIKE TELLING ONE*S 
992 |a GRANDCHILDREN STORIES OF THE GOOD, OR NOT SO GOOD, OLD DAYS. 8. THIS STATEMENT MAY BE SOMEWHAT HYPERBOLIC, BUT IT IS NOTABLE THE EXTENT TO WHICH POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS GROUNDED IN POLITICAL SCI- ENCE, INVEST LITTLE TIME AND ENERGY IN UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLICATING THIS CRU- CIAL POLITICAL DOCUMENT. BUT ALSO CONSULT THE OECD JOURNAL OF BUDGETING , AND THE WORK OF JON BLONDAL. 9. AS WELL AS THE EXTREME PARTISANSHIP, THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE US CONGRESS HELPS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE CONTINUING INABILITIES TO PASS A BUDGET IN A TIMELY MANNER. XXXI I NTRODUCTION : A NALYSIS AS A RT AARONWILDAVSKY *WHAT IS POLICY ANALYSIS? WHY DO YOU ASK?* ANONYMOUS IT WOULD BE A DISSERVICE TO SUGGEST THAT MY IMAGES OF POLICY ANALYSIS SPRANG FULL BLOWN FROM IMAGINATION, OR WITH THE EXACT ORDER INTO WHICH THESE IDEAS HAVE BEEN PRESSED HERE. THESE CONCEPTIONS ARE SHAPED BY WHAT WAS HAPPENING TO ME*DEVISING A CURRICULUM FOR A SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY, AS MUCH IN AN EFFORT TO UNDERSTAND ANALYSIS AS TO TEACH IT*AND TO THE COUNTRY*THE SOCIAL PROGRAMS OF THE SIXTIES, FILTERED THROUGH ONE TO TWO HUNDRED ANALYSES A YEAR DONE BY STUDENTS AND COLLEAGUES. THAT I CAME TO ANALYSIS VIA THE STUDY OF BUDGETING, IN WHICH POLITICS AND ECONOMICS ARE INTERTWINED, MAY ACCOUNT FOR MY REFUSAL TO DISSOLVE ONE INTO THE OTHER AND MY PREFERENCE FOR TRYING TO KEEP THEM TOGETHER AS POLITICAL ECONOMY. THOUGH NOW I THINK OF MYSELF AS A POLITICAL ECONOMIST, I WAS FIRST A POLITICAL SCIENTIST. THE CAPACITY TO MAKE DECISIONS IN THE FUTURE, TO MOBILIZE SUP- PORT FOR SUBSTANCE*THAT IS, POLITICAL RATIONALITY*IS AS LEAST AS IMPORTANT AS GENERATING ECONOMIC GROWTH SO THAT THERE WILL BE RESOURCES TO ALLOCATE. A. WILDAVSKY ( * ) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, BERKELEY, CA, USA XXXII INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART SINCE POLICY ANALYSIS IS ABOUT PEOPLE, A CATEGORY IN WHICH I AM FORCED TO INCLUDE MYSELF, MY EXPERIENCES MATTER. HAVING BEGUN WITH MODEST EXPECTATIONS (POLITICS DISCOURAGES HEROICS) 
992 |a I HAVE NOT BEEN DISILLUSIONED BY THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING PROGRAMS THAT WORK WELL. THERE WAS LITTLE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER (IF ONLY WE HAD EITHER!) WOULD BE MORE SUCCESSFUL NOW THAN IN THE PAST. PROBLEM-SOLVING MAY, HOWEVER, GIVE WAY TO PROBLEM SUCCESSION (CUT ONE OFF AND ANOTHER SPROUTS). INSTEAD OF ATTENDING ONLY TO TROUBLE (HOW FAR HAVE WE FALLEN SHORT?), I HAVE LEARNED ALSO TO ASK WHETHER OUR CURRENT DIF- FICULTIES ARE BETTER OR WORSE FOR PEOPLE THAN THE ONES WE USED TO HAVE. ON THIS SCORE, AS I WILL TRY TO SHOW, MODEST OPTIMISM IS JUSTIFIED. IT IS NO MEAN ACCOMPLISHMENT THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS PUT ITS MONEY WHERE ITS MOUTH IS BY INCREASING BOTH ABSOLUTELY AND PROPORTIONATELY THE AMOUNTS DEVOTED TO SOCIAL-WELFARE PROGRAMS. IT HELPS TO LEARN WHAT GOVERNMENT IS WORSE AT DOING (CHANGING CITIZENS* BEHAVIOR) AND WHAT IT IS BETTER AT DOING (MOVING MONEY). THEN WE WOULD BE LESS SURPRISED THAT CITIZENS ARE BETTER ABLE TO GET GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE WHAT IT DOES THAN THEY ARE AT GETTING GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE THE WAY THEIR FELLOW CITIZENS BEHAVE. IN THE BEGINNING, HOWEVER, WERE THE WORDS*ATTRACTIVE, ELUSIVE, FRUS- TRATING. HOW CAN YOU TEACH (OR WRITE A BOOK ABOUT) A SUBJECT IF YOU CAN*T SAY WHAT IT IS? AT THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY IN BERKELEY, I DISCOURAGED DIS- CUSSIONS ON THE MEANING OF POLICY ANALYSIS. HUNDREDS OF CONVERSATIONS ON THIS SLIPPERY SUBJECT HAD PROVEN FUTILE, EVEN EXASPERATING, POSSIBLY DAN- GEROUS. FOR WHENEVER MY COLLEAGUES AND I BEGAN OUR COURSES BY ASKING *WHAT IS A POLICY ANALYSIS?* OR, A CHOICE THAT PROVED TO BE WORSE, *WHAT IS A PROBLEM?* STUDENT ANXIETY ROSE ALARMINGLY. THE CLASSROOM CRACKLED WITH TENSION. IT WAS AS IF STUDENTS FELT THE FACULTY WERE WITHHOLDING SOME- THING VITAL*THE STRANGE AND SIMPLE SECRET OF ANALYSIS (WHICH WE MUST HAVE KNOWN BECAUSE STUDENTS COULDN*T LEARN IT). PERHAPS ANALYSIS WAS LIKE ONE OF T.S.ELIOT*S CREATURES IN OLD POSSUM*S BOOK OF PRACTICAL CATS . 
992 |a WHEN YOU NOTICE A CAT IN PROFOUND MEDITATION, THE REASON, I TELL YOU, IS ALWAYS THE SAME: HIS MIND IS ENGAGED IN RAPT CONTEMPLATION OF THE THOUGHT, OF THE THOUGHT, OF THE THOUGHT OF HIS NAME: HIS INEFFABLE EFFABLE EFFANINEFFABLE DEEP AND INSCRUTABLE SINGULAR NAME. XXXIII INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART YET OUR PROMISE OF PIE IN THE SKY BY-AND-BY, THOUGH DESIGNED OF COURSE, TO SOOTHE THE RAGING BEAST, WAS PROVED BY EXPERIENCE. STUDENTS DID LEARN TO DO ANALYSIS; AND IF OUR OBSERVATION AND THEIR JOB EXPERIENCE WERE ANY GUIDE, STUDENTS NOT ONLY FELT BUT WERE MORE COMPETENT. WHAT WAS IT, THEN, THAT COULD BE LEARNED BUT NOT EXPLAINED, THAT ALL OF US COULD SOMETIMES DO BUT THAT NONE OF US COULD EVER DEFINE (AT LEAST TO ANYBODY ELSE*S SATIS- FACTION)? OUR INSCRUTABLE INEFFABLE FRIEND, POLICY ANALYSIS. COLD COMFORT; THOSE WHO CAN*T SAY WHAT IT IS, TEACH, AND THOSE WHO CAN DO POLICY ANALYSIS, STILL CAN*T SAY HOW IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DO IT. A FIRST CLUE CAME FROM AN UNUSUAL ASPECT OF OUR TEACHING EXPERIENCE: POLICY ANALYSIS IS BETTER TAUGHT BACKWARD. INSTEAD OF BEGINNING BY FOR- MULATING A PROBLEM, CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS, DEVELOPING CRITERIA, APPLYING CRITERIA TO DATA, AND SO ON, STUDENTS* WORK IMPROVED WHEN EXER- CISES WENT THE OTHER WAY AROUND. THE BEST WAY TO BEGIN LEARNING WAS TO APPLY STRONG CRITERIA TO GOOD DATA, GO ON TO CREATE CRITERIA AND DISCOVER ALTERNATIVES, AND, AFTER NUMEROUS TRIALS, FORMULATE PROBLEM AT THE VERY END. WHY DID ANXIETY DECLINE AND CONFIDENCE RISE WHEN ENTERING THROUGH THE BACK DOOR? POSSIBLY, FORMULATING THE PROBLEM WAS MORE LIKE THE END THAN THE BEGINNING OF ANALYSIS. REFLECTION, ACCOMPANIED BY OBSERVATION OF RESEARCH IN PUBLIC POLICY, REVEALED THAT CREATIVITY CONSISTS OF FINDING A PROBLEM ABOUT WHICH SOME- THING CAN AND OUGHT TO BE DONE. IN A WORD, THE SOLUTION IS PART OF DEFINING THE PROBLEM. MIKE TEITZ TELLS ABOUT A SOLDIER IN NEW ZEALAND WHO WAS ORDERED TO BUILD A BRIDGE ACROSS A RIVER WITHOUT ENOUGH MEN OR MATE- 
992 |a RIAL. HE STARED ALONG THE BANK LOOKING GLUM WHEN A MAORI WOMAN CAME ALONG ASKING, *WHY SO SAD, SOLDIER?* HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN A PROBLEM FOR WHICH THERE WAS NO SOLUTION. IMMEDIATELY SHE BRIGHTENED, SAYING, *CHEER UP! NO SOLUTION, NO PROBLEM.* PROBLEM-FINDING IS ANALOGOUS TO INVENTING OR THEORIZING. IN INVENTION THE TASK IS NOT TO COMPILE A LIST OF ALL UNFULFILLED HUMAN NEEDS (OR EVEN THE SHORTER LIST OF THOSE WHICH DESERVE FULFILLMENT), BUT TO CONNECT WHAT MIGHT BE WANTED WITH WHAT CAN BE PROVIDED. THE PRIZES IN SCIENCE GO TO THOSE WHO CHOOSE PROBLEMS THAT TURN OUT TO BE INTERESTING AND SOLVABLE. SO, TOO, IN POLICY ANALYSIS, THE MOST CREATIVE CALCULATIONS CONCERN FINDING PROBLEMS FOR WHICH SOLUTIONS MIGHT BE ATTEMPTED. NO WONDER, THEN, THAT STUDENTS GO INTO SHOCK THE FIRST WEEK IF THEY ARE (IN EFFECT) ASKED TO CREATE ORIGINAL SOCIAL INVENTIONS. EVEN THEIR TEACHERS USUALLY CAN*T DO THAT ON DEMAND. BECAUSE POLICY ANALYSIS PRESUMES CREATIVITY, A SUBJECT ON WHICH MUCH IS XXXIV INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART WRITTEN BUT LITTLE IS KNOWN, OUR INABILITY TO TEACH ANALYSIS DIRECTLY IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND. (THE INJUNCTION *BE CREATIVE!* IS NOTORIOUSLY UNHELPFUL.) PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION WHAT TOOLS DOES THE POLICY ANALYST USE? QUALITATIVE POLITICAL THEORY, FOR REFINING OUR PICTURE OF WHERE WE WANT TO GO; QUANTITATIVE MODELING, FOR SYSTEMATIZING GUESSWORK ON HOW TO GET THERE; MICROECONOMICS, FOR DIS- CIPLINING DESIRE WITH LIMITED RESOURCES, AND MACRO-ORGANIZATION THEORY, FOR INSTILLING THE WILL TO CORRECT ERRORS: EACH HAS ITS PLACE. POLICY ANALYSIS, HOWEVER IS ONE ACTIVITY FOR WHICH THERE CAN BE NO FIXED PROGRAM, FOR POLICY ANALYSIS IS SYNONYMOUS WITH CREATIVITY, WHICH MAY BE STIMULATED BY THEORY AND SHARPENED BY PRACTICE, WHICH CAN BE LEARNED BUT NOT TAUGHT. CREATIVITY IN POLICY ANALYSIS MAY HAVE SOCIAL ROOTS. HISTORY IS FOOD FOR THOUGHT. ALL WHO HAVE LIVED THROUGH THE EXALTED PROMISES AND DISAP- 
992 |a POINTED HOPES FED BY THE SOCIAL PROGRAMS OF THE SIXTIES, TO COME TO OUR TIMES, ARE SEARED BY THAT EXPERIENCE. MUCH OF THE SCHOLARSHIP OF THE SEVEN- TIES, MY OWN INCLUDED, HAS BEEN AN EFFORT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT WENT WRONG AND TO LEARN HOW THINGS MIGHT BE MADE TO WORK BETTER, OR WHETHER GOV- ERNMENT SHOULD TAKE SOME ACTIONS AT ALL. THE MORE GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO DO, THE LARGER ITS DIFFICULTIES. FOR IN THAT GREATER ATTEMPT IT MUST INTER- VENE FURTHER IN PERSONAL BEHAVIOR OR EXTRACT MORE OF PERSONAL INCOME. DIOGENES NOTWITHSTANDING, IT APPEARED EASIER TO FIND AN HONEST MAN THAN AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM. WHY? VISITING WASHINGTON, I HEARD THE PLAINTIVE CRY THAT PROSPECTS WHICH LOOKED ROSY THERE WOULD DISSIPATE IN THE HINTERLANDS OF THIS VAST CONTINENT. IN RESPONSE I STARTED AN ACTION-RESEARCH PROJECT IN OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA. WHEN JEFF PRESSMAN TOLD ME THAT A PROGRAM DESIGNED TO CREATE MINOR- ITY EMPLOYMENT THERE WAS CREDITED WITH STOPPING RIOTS. I ASKED HIM TO INVESTIGATE. IT TURNED OUT THAT LITTLE HAD HAPPENED. AS SIMPLE AS THE PROJECT APPEARED, IT HAD RUN INTO NUMEROUS DETOURS, DELAYS, AND BLIND ALLEYS. TO DISCOVER WHY SOMETHING THAT SEEMED SIMPLE ACTUALLY WAS SO CONVOLUTED, WE WROTE A BOOK ON IMPLEMENTATION 1 TO SHOW HOW THE COMPLEXITY OF JOINT ACTION*MULTITUDES OF AGENCIES, INNUMERABLE REGULATIONS, STACKED-UP LEV- ELS OF GOVERNMENT*MADE IT DIFFICULT TO MOVE. THE REFORMS OF THE PAST LAY LIKE BENIGN BOOBY TRAPS, WHICH COULD MAKE ONE STUMBLE EVEN IF THEY DID NOT EXPLODE. YET ALL THIS HAD BEEN SET UP FOR REASONS THAT ONCE SEEMED GOOD. THE MORE THE NATION ATTEMPTED TO CONTROL PUBLIC POLICY, THE LESS CON- TROL THERE SEEMED TO BE. A TROUBLESOME PARALLEL ASPECT OF THIS EXPAND- ING PUBLIC SECTOR WAS THE FEELING THAT UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES WERE XXXV INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART OVER-WHELMING THE ABILITY TO COPE. VAST CHANGES WERE TAKING PLACE AMID SUSPICION THAT HERE WAS CHANGE FOR CHANGE*S SAKE ALONE. IMMOBILITY AND 
992 |a CHANGE APPEARED TO BE DIFFERENT SIDES OF THE SAME COIN. INCREASINGLY POLI- CIES LED LIVES OF THEIR OWN, INDEPENDENT OF HUMAN VOLITION. I WONDERED IF POLICY COULD POSSIBLY BE ITS OWN CAUSE. INDEED, IT WAS POSSIBLE. THE LARGER EACH POLICY GROWS IN ITS OWN SEC- TOR, THE MORE IT INSINUATES ITSELF INTO THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT WITH WHICH WE MUST CONTEND. MORE AND MORE PUBLIC POLICY IS ABOUT COPING WITH CONSEQUENCES OF PAST POLICIES*YEARS OF CONTROVERSY OVER SPENDING A BILLION DOLLARS OF FEDERAL MONEY IN NEWYORK CITY ON HIGHWAYS OR SUBWAYS GO ON WITHOUT A WORD ABOUT RESPONDING TO ITS TRANSPORTATION NEEDS BUT A MILLION WORDS ABOUT USING OTHER PEOPLE*S MONEY*AND LESS AND LESS ABOUT EVENTS IN SOCIETY. THE MORE WE DO, THEREFORE, THE MORE THERE IS FOR US TO DO, AS EACH PROGRAM BUMPS INTO OTHERS AND SETS OFF CONSEQUENCES ALL DOWN THE LINE. IN THIS WAY PAST SOLUTIONS, IF THEY ARE LARGE ENOUGH, TURN INTO FUTURE PROBLEMS. AND WHO IS TO DEAL WITH SUCH PROBLEMS? NATURALLY, THOSE PEOPLE PAID TO WORK AT IT FULL TIME, NAMELY, THE BUREAUCRACY. THAT IS HOW THE BUREAUCRATIC SECTORS OF POLICY BECOME AT ONCE THE STRONGEST STOKERS AND THE MOST DETERMINED DAMPERS OF CHANGE. IN THE GROWING BUREAUCRA- TIZATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, WE EXPERIENCE DIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF THE GOOD THINGS WE HAVE DONE*IN ALLEVIATING POVERTY, IMPROVING MEDICINE, INCREAS- ING SAFETY, PURIFYING THE ENVIRONMENT, AND ALL THE REST. WHY THEN DO WE FEEL SO BAD ABOUT THE GOOD WE HAVE TRIED TO DO? THE TITLE OF CHAP. 2 , *DOING BETTER AND FEELING WORSE,* EXPRESSES THE CONTRADICTION: HEALTH RATES FOR ALL SECTORS OF THE POPULATION HAVE IMPROVED; ACCESS TO MEDICAL FACILITIES FOR THE POOR AND ELDERLY ARE MORE NEARLY EQUAL; YET THE FEELING OF CRISIS IN HEALTH CARE GROWS. UNWILLING TO TRY EITHER A MARKET SOLUTION, ABOLISHING INSURANCE AND SUBSIDY, OR A BUREAUCRATIC SOLU- TION, ABOLISHING PRIVATE MEDICINE, WE KEEP FUNNELING IN MORE MONEY AND COMPLAINING ABOUT THE INFLATION THAT COMES OUT. WHERE DOES THE FAULT LIE, 
992 |a THEN*WITH POLICIES THAT HAVE UNDESIRABLE SIDE EFFECTS, OR WITH PEOPLE WHO WANT THE POLICIES, BUT NOT THE RESULTING PERILS? COMPARING THE SOCIAL STATE OF THE NATION BEFORE AND AFTER THESE SOCIAL POLICIES, HOWEVER, I WONDER IF WE WOULD BE WILLING TO TRADE CURRENT PROB- LEMS FOR THOSE WE USED TO HAVE. I WOULD NOT. I DON*T CONSIDER THE SIXTIES A DISASTROUS DECADE NOR WOULD I GO BACK WILLINGLY TO A TIME WHEN RACE, POV- ERTY, ENVIRONMENT, AND A HOST OF OTHER DIFFICULTIES WERE IGNORED. PERHAPS, INSTEAD, WE NEED TO ASK IF PRESENT STANDARDS FOR JUDGING PUBLIC POLICIES ARE APPROPRIATE. XXXVI INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART THINKING THAT SOCIAL ILLS ARE PUZZLES THAT CAN BE SOLVED (ONCE AND FOR ALL, AS PRESIDENT CARTER MIGHT SAY) INSTEAD OF PROBLEMS THAT MAY BE ALLEVIATED OR EVENTUALLY SUPERSEDED, CAN MAKE US DESPONDENT WHEN THEY DO NOT YIELD TO OUR MINISTRATIONS. A GOOD COMPARISON IS TO DO SOMETHING, AS OPPOSED TO NOTHING, AND THEN EVALUATE THE RESULT. THE RUB THERE IS THAT YOU DON*T KNOW WHETHER SOME OTHER ACTION MIGHT HAVE BEEN BETTER OR WORSE. A BET- TER COMPARISON IS TO CONTRAST THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE NOW WITH THOSE WE HAD BEFORE. INSTEAD OF THINKING OF PERMANENT SOLUTIONS WE SHOULD THINK OF PERMANENT PROBLEMS IN THE SENSE THAT ONE PROBLEM ALWAYS SUCCEEDS AND REPLACES ANOTHER. THEN WE MIGHT ASK WHETHER TODAY*S ANSWERS ARE MORE MORAL OR MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE SOLUTIONS THEY SUCCEEDED OR WHICH THEY MIGHT REPLACE. ARE TODAY*S INFLATED MEDICAL COSTS PREFERABLE TO YESTERDAY*S RESTRICTED ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE? THE CAPACITY OF POLICIES TO GENERATE MORE INTERESTING SUCCESSORS AND OUR ABILITY BETTER TO LEARN FROM THEM WHAT WE OUGHT TO PREFER, MAY BE THEIR MOST IMPORTANT QUALITY. BUT WHY DON*T PUBLIC AGENCIES SEEM TO PROFIT FROM MISTAKES? IS IT BECAUSE THESE INSTITUTIONS DON*T WANT TO (THE WORSE CONDITIONS GET THE HIGHER THEIR BUDGET), OR DON*T KNOW HOW? STUDY OF BUDGETING IN FEDERAL RECREATION AGENCIES POINTED ME IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. 2 THE TRADITIONAL BUDGET WAS 
992 |a ATTUNED TO ITS POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT BUT DID NOT PRODUCE AN EVALUATION THAT QUESTIONED FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND PROGRAMS. THE NEW PROGRAM BUDGET, WHICH WAS OUT OF TUNE WITH POLITICS BUT DESIGNED TO DO ANALYSIS, ALSO FAILED TO USE EVALUATION THAT WOULD CHALLENGE CURRENT PRO- GRAMS. THE IMPORTANT QUESTION, THEREFORE, IS WHY AGENCIES, REGARDLESS OF THEIR TECHNIQUES, DO NOT USE EVALUATION. THE EASY ANSWER IS THAT ORGANIZATIONS DON*T WANT TO ROCK THE BOAT; THEY ESTABLISH INTERESTS*BENEFITS, CAREERS, CLIENTELE*APART FROM ANY SUPPOSEDLY DESIRABLE OBJECTIVES. THE HARD ANSWER IS THAT, IN ORDER TO DO GOOD THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS NEED SOURCES OF SUPPORT THAT ENCOURAGE STABILITY AS WELL AS CHANGE. RESISTANCE TO EVALUATION IS PART OF SELF-PROTECTION. SKEPTICISM CLASHES WITH DOGMA IN ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS IN THOUGHT. GETTING ORGA- NIZATIONS TO ACT IS THE HARDEST PART OF POLICY ANALYSIS. UNLESS IT IS DESIGNED TO BE STILL BORN, ANALYSIS INCLUDES ACTION. THAT IS WHY EFFORTS TO MAKE ORGA- NIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AN INTEGRAL PART OF POLICY ANALYSIS (RATHER THAN AN AFTERTHOUGHT) ARE ESSENTIAL. MY EXPERIENCE AS AN ADMINISTRATOR REINFORCED A PASSION FOR CORRECTING ERRORS. TRYING TO AVOID ERROR STULTIFIES; BESIDES NO APPLICATION OF CARE WILL AVOID ALL MISTAKES. EXPECTING TO MAKE ERRORS AND PICK UP AFTER ONESELF IS MUCH MORE SATISFACTORY. JOHN WHEELER WROTE, *OUR WHOLE PROBLEM IS TO XXXVII INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART MAKE ERRORS FAST ENOUGH.* YET, IN A UNIVERSITY WHERE EVERY COLLEAGUE IS KING AND RATIONALIZATION IS HIGH ART, IT IS HARD TO CONVINCE PEOPLE WHO THINK THEY KNOW BETTER TO RECOGNIZE MISTAKES AND PERSUADE THEM (ORDERS ARE OUT OF THE QUESTION) TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION. IN TEACHING, IF ERRORS ARE NOBODY*S BUSINESS EXCEPT THE INSTRUCTORS*, OTHER COLLEAGUES WILL PAY NO ATTENTION AND THERE WILL BE NO EXTERNAL AND INDEPENDENT CORRECTIVE. YOU WILL AND THAT IN THE APPENDIX TO THIS BOOK ON *PRINCIPLES FOR A GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC 
992 |a POLICY* I SUGGEST A COLLECTIVE INTEREST IN CORRECTING THE REQUIRED COURSES. BY MAKING IT CLEAR THAT ERROR WAS EXPECTED, CORRECTION WAS CONSIDERED COMMONPLACE AND THOSE CORRECTED DID NOT FEEL THREATENED. FINDING A NEW MISTAKE BECAME THE THING TO DO. UNLESS RECOGNITION OF ERRORS IS REWARDED, THEY WILL NOT BE CORRECTED. TO RECOGNIZE ERROR IS ONE THING: TO BECOME A SIDE-SHOW EXAMPLE OF ERROR THAT CANNOT BE CORRECTED IS QUITE ANOTHER. IF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE ASKED TO CHANGE PEOPLE*S BEHAVIOR (HEALTH HABITS, READING SCORES, CRIM- INAL ACTIVITIES) THAT NO ONE CAN (OR IS WILLING TO) CONTROL, AGENCIES WILL BE GUILTY OF FAILURE EVEN BEFORE BEING SO CHARGED. NO ONE LIKES TO BE DUBBED A FAILURE, SO PUBLIC AGENCIES TRY TO ESCAPE BY TRANSFORMING WHAT THEY CAN DO INTO WHAT THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO DO. IF THE CHANGE IS WITHIN THE AGENCY, CONTROLLABLE RESOURCES MAY BECOME THE AGENCY*S OBJECTIVES; WHAT AGENCY WOULD FAIL TO SEEK SALVATION BY SPENDING? OR IF THE CHANGE IS IN THE CLIENT, AN AGENCY CAN FIND CLIENTELE (READING-READY CHILDREN, EMPLOYABLE ADULTS, HEALTHY ELDERLY) WHO WILL BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES. MAKING WHAT ONE CAN DO INTO WHAT ONE IS SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPLISH, OR CHOOSING CAPABLE CLIENTS WHO ARE ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED, ARE MEANS OF CON- STRUCTING A BENEVOLENT ENVIRONMENT. BUT ESCAPING EXTERNAL CENSURE IS NOT THE SAME AS AN INTERNAL DESIRE FOR SELF-CORRECTION. THE GOOD ORGANIZATION EVALUATES ITS OWN ACTIVITIES, CORRECTING ERROR AS IT GOES ALONG, AND ACKNOWLEDGING MISTAKES AS A WAY OF IMPROVING PERFORMANCE. BECAUSE IT GOES AGAINST ORGANIZATIONAL NATURE, HOWEVER, SELF- EVALUATION MUST BE REINFORCED BY STUDIES THAT ARE EXTERNAL, MULTIPLE, INDEPENDENT, AND CONTINUOUS. EVALUATION SHOULD HE INDEPENDENT (AND THEREFORE EXTERNAL) TO AVOID SELF-SERVING BEHAVIOR. BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE IS INVOLVED, EVALUATION SHOULD BE MULTIPLE. MULTIPLICITY ALSO FACILITATES GEN- ERATION OF ALTERNATIVES WITHOUT WHICH CHOICE CANNOT BE GENUINE. BECAUSE 
992 |a THERE IS NO ONE TRUTH*INDEED, BECAUSE CORRECTING ERROR RATHER THAN ESTAB- LISHING TRUTH IS THE NORM*EVALUATION SHOULD BE CONTINUOUS SO THAT COM- MON UNDERSTANDINGS (NOT MERE ASSERTIONS) CAN GROW. EVALUATION FARES WELL WHEN A VARIETY OF ORGANIZATIONS ARE MOTIVATED TO CONDUCT AND USE STUDIES. XXXVIII INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART EVALUATION, THEREFORE, IS CONCEIVED BEST AS A SOCIAL PROCEDURE THAT IS THE CUMULATIVE RESULT OF MANY EFFORTS RATHER THAN JUST ONE. IF EVALUATION IS SOCIAL, CORRECTION OF ERRORS DEPENDS ON HOW SOCIETY IS ORGANIZED. THE RELATIVE OBJECTIVITY OF ANALYSIS DEPENDS ON PEOPLE LIV- ING TOGETHER IN REASONABLE TRUST WITHIN A COMMON CULTURE. THE CULTURAL CONDITIONS WITHIN WHICH ANALYSIS TAKES PLACE*THE SORT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE THOUGHT DESIRABLE, THE VALUES TO HE OBTAINED*GUIDE AND SHAPE WHAT IS DONE. IF TRUST DECLINES, THE FRAMEWORK OF FACTS THAT CAN BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED DECLINES WITH IT. WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON A STARTING PLACE, THERE IS NO END TO DEBATE. THEORIES HARDEN INTO DOGMA, AND ASSERTION REPLACES EVIDENCE. POLICIES THEN ARE JUDGED NOT BY THEIR MERITS BUT BY THE MOTIVES OF THEIR PROPOSERS. EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS, TO BE SURE, IS NOT NECESSARILY ANALYSIS OF POLICY. TELLING PEOPLE THEY HAVE NOT ACHIEVED INTENDED OBJECTIVES DOES NOT NECES- SARILY HELP THEM WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. UNFORTUNATE PROGRAM MANAGERS WHO NEED TO KNOW WHICH ACTIVITY DESERVES PRIORITY IN THE BUDGET ARE NOT HELPED BY BLANKET CONDEMNATION OR THE KIND OF PROPOSALS THAT ONLY THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, THE UNITED NATIONS*ANYBODY BUT SOMEONE AT THEIR LEVEL*CAN ACT UPON. LOOKING BACK AT WHAT WE WANT FROM EVALUATION IN POLITICAL ARENAS*REC- OGNITION AND CORRECTION OF ERRORS, ENCOURAGED BY SOCIAL PROCESSES RICH WITH VARIED REACTIONS*WE SEE SOMETHING SIMILAR TO DECISION-MAKING IN ECO- NOMIC MARKETS. FOR A MARKET TO QUALIFY AS RELATIVELY FAIR AND FUNCTIONING, IT MIGHT HAVE MANY BUYERS AND SELLERS (NOT JUST ONE), REPEATEDLY MAKING INDEPENDENT BIDS (NOT JUST ONCE), EVALUATING RESULTS COMPARED T 
992 |a OPPORTU- NITIES ELSEWHERE (NOT JUST IN THIS MARKET). IN A WORD, MARKETS SHOULD BE RIFE WITH REDUNDANCY. EACH BID BUILDS UPON AND SUCCEEDS THE ONE BEFORE, AND ERRORS ARE CORRECTED BY HISTORICAL COMPARISON WITH THE LAST PREVIOUS INTER- ACTION. PRICES THAT REFLECT CURRENT CONDITIONS ARE RETAINED AND THOSE WHICH DO NOT ARE REJECTED. MARKETS THAT FUNCTION SO AS TO RECOGNIZE AND CORRECT ERROR, THEREFORE, FULFILL NORMS FOR INTERACTION (INDEPENDENCE, MULTIPLICITY, CONTINUITY) THAT AID BUREAUCRACIES IN EVALUATION. JUST AS NO MAN NECESSARILY IS GOOD FOR ALL SEASONS, NO INSTITUTION*S STRUC- TURE IS EQUALLY APPROPRIATE UNDER ANY AND ALL CONDITIONS. PRIVATE MARKETS HAVE WELL-KNOWN IMPERFECTIONS, SUCH AS FAILING TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF INEQUALI- TIES IN DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME. MARKETS MAKE DOLLARS (NOT PEOPLE) EQUAL. THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS, WHEN WHAT ONE DOES IMPOSES DIRECT BURDENS ON, OTHERS WHO CANNOT BE COMPENSATED, MAY DEMAND NON- MARKET MECHANISMS. IF MARKETS WERE PERFECT, AFTER ALL, THERE WOULD BE NO XXXIX INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART NEED FOR GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION. SUPPOSE, HOWEVER, WE REMOVE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ECONOMIC MARKETS AND POLITICAL ARENAS, BY CONSIDERING A PROBLEM*INFLATION OF MEDICAL COSTS*FOR WHICH CONTEMPORARY HISTORY HAS RULED OUT A MARKET SOLUTION. IS IT BETTER FOR GOVERNMENT TO EXERT COST CONTROL BY MONITORING EVERY TRANSACTION IN HOSPITALS AT THE COST OF BEING OVERWHELMED OR SHOULD GOVERNMENT GIVE LUMP SUMS, NOT TO BE EXCEEDED, LEAVING TO HOSPITALS THE DETAILED ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES? EVEN WITHIN A GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, THEN, PLANNING AND POLITICS*COGITATION VERSUS INTERACTION*COMPETE FOR OUR LOYALTIES. IT IS NOT POLITICS AND ECONOMICS THAT ARE AT LOGGERHEADS, BECAUSE BOTH ARE FORMS OF INTERACTION, BUT RATHER ORDERS THAT TELL PEOPLE WHAT TO DO VERSUS HELPING THEM FIGURE THINGS OUT FOR THEMSELVES. IF PLANNING WERE JUDGED BY RESULTS, THAT IS, BY WHETHER LIFE FOLLOWED 
992 |a THE DICTATES OF THE PLAN, THEN PLANNING HAS FAILED EVERYWHERE IT HAS BEEN TRIED. NOWHERE ARE PLANS FULFILLED. NO ONE, IT TURNS OUT, HAS THE KNOWLEDGE TO PREDICT SEQUENCES OF ACTIONS AND REACTIONS ACROSS THE REALM OF PUBLIC POLICY, AND NO ONE HAS THE POWER TO COMPEL OBEDIENCE. SO FAR SO BAD. WHY, THEN, IS PLANNING SO POPULAR? WHY, FACING UNIVERSALLY NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE, IS PLANNING STILL PURSUED? HAS MANKIND*S DESIRE TO CONTROL ITS FATE*ON PAPER WITH A PLAN, IF NOWHERE ELSE*LED TO JUSTIFICATION NOT BY DEEDS BUT BY FAITH? IF SO, PLANNING IS NOT SO MUCH AN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT PUBLIC POLICY (WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT POLLUTED WATER OR BAD HEALTH OR WHAT- EVER?) BUT A QUESTION IN THE FORM OF AN ANSWER: PROVIDE A PLAN. THINKING ABOUT PLANNING IN POOR COUNTRIES, 3 I WONDERED WHETHER FOL- LOWING THE FORMS OF PLANNING (SPECIFYING AND RANKING OBJECTIVES, SELECTING ALTERNATIVES, CHOOSING THE BEST ONE) WAS VALUED NOT FOR WHAT PLANNING DID BUT FOR WHAT IT WAS*COMPREHENSIVE, COORDINATED, CONSISTENT, ABOVE ALL, RATIONAL. THUS, PLANNING LED ME TO RATIONALITY. HOW COULD IT BE RATIONAL TO FAIL? IF PLANNING LED TO FAILURE, IF IT LED TO BAD BEHAVIOR INSTEAD OF RIGHT ACTION, THEN PLANNING MUST BE IRRATIONAL, I.E., KNOWN TO PRODUCE WRONG RESULTS. THE METHOD CALLED THE *RATIONAL PARADIGM* (ORDER OBJECTIVES, COMPARE ALTERNATIVES, CHOOSE THE HIGHEST RANKING) IS MISTAKEN AS DESCRIBING EITHER HOW DECISIONS ARE OR OUGHT TO BE MADE. THIS PARADIGM CONVEYS THE WRONG - HEADED IMPRESSION THAT ALL ONE HAS TO DO TO ANSWER A QUESTION IS TO ASK IT. JUST HOW THOROUGHLY AVAILABLE ANSWERS DETERMINE THE KINDS OF QUESTIONS ASKED (AS SOLUTIONS OFTEN SEARCH FOR PROBLEMS 4 AND RESOURCES AFFECT OBJEC- TIVES) REMAINS UNRECOGNIZED. CREATIVITY IS COMPROMISED BY SQUEEZING THE PEREGRINATIONS OF THE MIND INTO ONE SEQUENCE. 5 THE DERIVATION OF THE WORD XL INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART ANALYSIS ITSELF, WHICH COMES FROM A GREEK ROOT MEANING SUBDIVIDE, IS DERO- 
992 |a GATED BY IMPLYING THAT EVERYTHING WAS UNDERSTOOD AT ONCE, NOT, AS IS FAR MORE LIKELY, IN STEPS THROUGH WHICH, DARTING BACK AND FORTH, DIFFICULTIES ARE DIVIDED AND DECOMPOSED UNTIL THEY ARE MADE MANAGEABLE OR ABANDONED. THE HYPOTHETICAL JOURNAL OF NEGATIVE RESULTS IS A NONSTARTER. INTELLECTUAL COGITATION IS TREATED AS IF ALL WERE DONE BY A SINGLE MIND WHILE THE CONTRI- BUTIONS OF COUNTLESS OTHERS, WHOSE SOCIAL SUPPORT IS INDISPENSABLE FOR PAST IDEAS AND FUTURE CRITICISM, IS NEGLECTED. MEANWHILE A PASSION FOR GAINING POWER OVER NATURE BY ACTING AS IF THERE HAD ALWAYS BEEN (AND, THEREFORE, ALWAYS WILL BE) AN ORDERLY UNIVERSE OVERWHELMS EVERYDAY OBSERVATION TO THE CONTRARY. WHAT COULD BE RATIONALLY WRONG WITH COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERING WHERE WE WANT TO GO AND WHAT MIGHT BE THE BEST WAY OF GETTING THERE? SO MUCH IS WRONG IT IS HARD TO KNOW WHERE TO BEGIN. THE QUESTION ITSELF IS CONFUSING. DOES DESTINATION KNOW NO LIMITATION? DO WE FIRST DECIDE WHERE AND THEN HOW? THIS PRIORITY IS PERVERSE; IT IS NO BETTER THAN THE REVERSE, AS IF THE JOURNEY ALWAYS MATTERED MORE THAN THE DESTINATION. NO, WHERE ONE WISHES TO GO DEPENDS ON WHETHER ONE IS ABLE TO GET THERE. LIFE IS LARGER THAN OUR CATEGORIES. WHEN MY GRANDFATHER LOST THE FAMILY FORTUNE, COMPRISED OF FIFTY RUBLES, HE WENT TO SEE THE LOCAL MIRACLE RABBI, JOSEPH OF SLUTSK, WHO CONSULTED MYSTICAL WORKS, AND TOLD HIM TO COLLECT TEN KOPECS APIECE FROM HIS FRIENDS AND RELATIVES AND TAKE IT TO THE TRAIN. *BUT WHERE SHALL I GO?* GRANDPA CRIED. *AS FAR AS YOUR MONEY WILL TAKE YOU,* REPLIED THE RABBI, WHO KNEW MORE ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF RESOURCES TO OBJECTIVES THAN HIS SEEMINGLY SCIENTIFIC SUCCESSORS. ERROR MANIFESTS ITSELF AS CONFUSION BETWEEN A MODE OF PRESENTING RESULTS AND A METHOD OF MAKING CHOICES. HAVING FINISHED A STUDY OR MADE A DECI- SION, WE FIND IT ECONOMICAL OF TIME AND EFFORT TO PRESENT NOT THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION, THE SHORT CUTS, THE BLIND ALLEYS, THE TRIAL AND ERROR THAT LED TO A 
992 |a RECOMMENDATION, BUT, BY WAY OF SUMMARY, THE ALTERNATIVES ADOPTED WITH THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE WINNING ONE. ALAS, THE FORM HAS COME TO BE IDENTIFIED AS THE SUBSTANCE OF RATIONALITY. AND SO DEPARTURES FROM THIS FACILE FORM OF PRESENTATION ARE NOW LABELED IRRATIONAL BOTH AS DESCRIPTION (*THE CRAZY-QUILT PATTERNS OF POLITICS*) OR PRESCRIPTION (*MAN HAS BEEN MADE INTO A MACHINE BY SOULLESS MARKET FORCES*). HERE AGAIN INTEREST IN BUDGETING PROVED HELPFUL. ORIGINALLY I HAD SEEN THAT BUDGETARY PROCEDURES BASED ON COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING FAILED FROM THE USUAL LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND POWER. NO ONE KNEW HOW TO DO PROGRAM BUD- GETING (COMPARING CONSEQUENCES HORIZONTALLY ACROSS ALL MAJOR PROGRAMS) OR XLI INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART ZERO-BASE BUDGETING (COMPARING RESULTS VERTICALLY WITHIN EACH PROGRAM BY STARTING FROM SCRATCH EACH YEAR) BECAUSE THE REQUIRED CALCULATIONS BOGGLED THE MIND. BOTH BUDGETING METHODS THREATENED TO BURDEN OPERATING AGEN- CIES WITH GREATER CENTRAL CONTROL WITHOUT ENABLING THEM TO OFFER COMPEN- SATING GAINS; AGENCIES THUS LACKED INCENTIVES TO CO-OPERATE. THE PURPOSE OF ANALYSIS IS TO CONNECT KNOWLEDGE WITH POWER, NOT IGNORANCE WITH WEAKNESS. WHEN TIME AND ATTENTION ARE SCARCE IT CANNOT BE RATIONAL TO REVIVE ALL PAST CONFLICTS OR RECONSIDER ALL PAST SOLUTIONS (THOSE WHICH WORK AND THOSE WHICH DON*T). SIMPLIFICATION IS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID BEING SWAMPED. SENSITIVITY STUDIES, THE EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHICH VARIABLES MIGHT (OR, ALMOST AS IMPORTANT, MIGHT NOT) AFFECT POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, ARE PART AND PARCEL OF ANALYSIS. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN ONE LEARN WHICH VARIABLES MAY BE LEFT OUT SAFELY SO THAT ANALYSIS CAN BE CONVERTED INTO ACTION. THE ANALYSIS OF ANALYSIS, SO TO SPEAK*RELATING RESOURCES TO OBJECTIVES IN THE ACT OF ANALY- SIS, THE KNOWLEDGE, TIME, AND ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE TO THE ANALYST*DEMON- STRATES THE NEED FOR SIMPLIFICATION. ANALYST, STUDY THYSELF! ONE MUST DECIDE HOW MUCH INTELLECTUAL AS WELL AS MATERIAL RESOURCES ARE WORTH EXPENDING 
992 |a ON EACH PROGRAM. FEASIBILITY IS STUDIED IN ORDER TO LEARN WHETHER AND AT WHAT COST OBSTACLES MAY BE OVERCOME. TO SUM UP, BECAUSE ANALYSIS OF POLICY IS SUPPOSED TO BE AN APPLIED DISCIPLINE, IT INCLUDES NOT ONLY THINKING UP IDEAS BUT ALSO FACILITATING THEIR APPLICATION. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INCLUDING EXPECTED DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLE- MENTATION IN ANALYSIS, WHICH IS PART OF GOOD CRAFTSMANSHIP, AND ACTING TO IMPLEMENT THE ANALYSIS, WHICH IS SALESMANSHIP. IN MY BOOK, CRAFTSMANSHIP IS MANDATORY BUT SALESMANSHIP IS VOLUNTARY. THE UNARMED ANALYST RARELY CONQUERS. I APPRECIATE THE VALUE OF THOSE ANALYSTS WHO HAVE DONE THEIR BIT BY DOING GOOD WORK. MY PERSONAL PREFERENCE, HAVING GONE THAT FAR, IS TO SUPPLEMENT KNOWLEDGE WITH PERSUASION BY ACTIVELY HELPING POLICY IDEAS MAKE THEIR WAY IN THIS WORLD. IF ANALYSIS IS ABOUT ACCOMPLISHMENT, IT SHOULD BE USEFUL TO STUDY THAT ELEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS WHICH SPECIALIZES IN INFORMATION ABOUT RESULTS. WHEN I TAUGHT COURSES ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE DECISION-MAKING (MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES, SOCIAL INDICATORS, THE CRITI- CAL PATH METHOD, PPBS, ZBB, NATIONAL PLANNING), A COMMON PATTERN APPEARED: RATIONALITY WAS THOUGHT TO INHERE IN OBJECTIVES. OBJECTIVES ARE TO BE RANKED, COMPARED, DISCUSSED, IMPOSED, ACCEPTED*EVERYTHING, IT SEEMS, EXCEPT REALIZED. A MOMENT*S THOUGHT SHOULD CONVINCE ANYONE THAT OBJEC- TIVES DEPEND ON RESOURCES, FOR WHAT ONE MIGHT DO DEPENDS IN PART ON THE RESOURCES ONE HAS FOR ACHIEVING GOALS. BUT, IF THE POINT IS OBVIOUS, WHY IS IT XLII INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART SO OFTEN MISSED? JUST AS EVERY NEWLY MARRIED COUPLE HOPES TO AVOID WHAT- EVER LED TO THE PREVIOUS DIVORCE, SO A FIXATION ON OBJECTIVES IS A REACTION AGAINST A PRIOR ROMANCE WITH RESOURCES. WHERE OLDER MODES OF JUSTIFICATION CONCENTRATED ON RESOURCE INPUTS (EFFORT, MONIES, PERSONNEL), NEW MODES CONCENTRATE ON OBJECTIVES (READING SCORES, HEALTH RATES, RETURN TO PRISON). ANALYSIS OF POLICY, BY CONTRAST, ALWAYS CONSIDERS RESOURCES AND 
992 |a OBJECTIVES, MEANS AND ENDS TOGETHER, NEVER SEPARATELY. THE PROPER COMPARISON FOR THE POLICY ANALYST IS ALWAYS BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS, WHICH COMBINE RESOURCES AND OBJECTIVES, IN DIFFERENT WAYS, BUT NOT THE ONE OR THE OTHER IN ISOLATION. BY MAKING IT APPEAR THAT RATIONALITY RESIDED IN THE ACTIVITY OF RANK- ING OBJECTIVES, PLANNING HAD BECOME INEFFECTIVE AND THEREFORE IRRATIONAL. YET MY OWN ARGUMENT THAT RATIONALITY RESIDES IN RESULTS EVIDENTLY WAS NOT CONVINCING ENOUGH TO PLANNERS, NOR DID IT GO DEEP ENOUGH. WHY WERE PLANNERS SO DEAD SET AGAINST SPONTANEITY AND SO INSISTENT ON CONTROL? I HAD MISSED THE WAR OF OPPOSITES CLOSE TO THE HEART OF DISPUTES OVER PLANNING. TWO IMAGES BEGAN TO GROW IN MY MIND. ONE WAS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION, AS IN POLITICAL ARENAS OR ECONOMIC MARKETS, WHERE PEOPLE PURSUE THEIR OWN INTERESTS, AND THE RESULTS OF THEIR REACTIONS ARE SUMMED UP IN DECISIONS ABOUT OFFICE HOLDERS OR PRICES WITHOUT ANYONE NECESSARILY CONTROLLING THE SEQUENCES OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS OR INTENDING AN OUTCOME. THE TROUBLE- SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION ARE ITS WILLFULNESS, MESSINESS, AND APPAR- ENT DISORDER. SELFISHNESS AND CHAOS JACK APPEAL AS ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES. TO REMEDY THESE DEFECTS, I DREW FROM LINDBLOM THE OPPOSING IMAGE OF INTEL- LECTUAL COGITATION 6 THAT ORDERS SOCIAL RELATIONS THROUGH MENTAL PROCESSES AS IF THEY WERE TAKING PLACE IN ONE MIND. CONTROL IS EXERCISED BY ANTICIPA- TION. SOCIAL ACTORS ARE ASSIGNED POSITIONS, GIVEN MOTIVATIONS, AND GUIDED THROUGH THE MIND OF THE PLANNER TO THAT DESTINATION DETERMINED TO BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF ALL. INTELLECTUAL COGITATION IMPOSES SEVERE STRAINS ON COGNITIVE CAPACITIES; CENTRAL COMMAND IS IN DANGER OF BECOMING REMOTE OR OPPRESSIVE. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SOCIAL INTERACTION AND INTELLECTUAL COGI- TATION INVOLVES DIFFERENT PSYCHOLOGIES (EXPRESSION VERSUS CONTROL), COGNI- TIVE STYLES (ADAPTATION VERSUS ANTICIPATION), POLITICAL PROCESSES (BARGAINING 
992 |a VERSUS HIERARCHY), AND MORAL CALCULUS (THE INDIVIDUAL VERSUS THE COLLECTIVE). WITH DIFFERENCES SO FUNDAMENTAL THAT THEIR FULL EXTENT IS OFTEN UNRECOG- NIZED, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT APPARENT AGREEMENT ON ONE DIRECTION BREAKS DOWN ON OTHERS, OR THAT THERE IS DIFFICULTY AGREEING ON FACTS*WHICH IN ANY EVENT RARELY APPEAR DECISIVE IN DESIGNING OR EVALUATING POLICIES. COMPARING INTERACTION AMONG A MULTIPLICITY OF UNITS WITH PLAN- NING BY HIERARCHY IN JUST ONE LEADS TO RENEWED INTEREST IN CENTRALIZATION XLIII INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM APPLY NOT MERELY TO RELA- TIONS BETWEEN CENTRAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS BUT ALSO TO RELATIONS WITHIN AGENCIES AND PROGRAMS. EVIDENCE IS ACCUMULATING THAT IN PUBLIC POLICY ECONOMIES OF SCALE ARE ILLUSORY. FOR THE MOST PART, INCREASING SIZE COUPLED WITH CENTRAL DIRECTION IS ACCOMPANIED BY DECLINING PERFORMANCE IN CON- SOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICTS, POLICE FORCES, AND A HOST OF OTHER SERVICES. MY FEDERAL BIAS*WHEN IN DOUBT, A LARGE NUMBER OF SMALL UNITS ARE PREFERABLE TO A SMALL NUMBER OF LARGE ONES*INCLINES TO INTERACTION SO AS TO MAKE GOVERNMENT MORE ACCESSIBLE TO CITIZENS. ANALYSIS IS NEEDED NOT TO ELIMI- NATE INTERACTION BY CONSOLIDATION BUT TO LIBERATE IT BY DIFFERENT DESIGNS FOR DECENTRALIZATION. EVIDENTLY, PEOPLE INTERESTED IN ANALYZING POLICY DO NOT WANT TO DO AWAY WITH INTELLECT OR TO DO WITHOUT INTERACTION. ANALYSTS WANT TO ANTICIPATE DIFFICULTIES AS WELL AS TO REACT TO THEM. AS MUCH AS THEY ENJOY SOLVING PROB- LEMS, ANALYSTS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE MOST DIFFICULTIES DEALT WITH BY THE REL- EVANT PARTIES. YET ANALYSTS ALSO WANT TO BE ABLE TO SUGGEST THAT WAYS OTHER THAN THOSE VOICED MAY BE PREFERABLE. POLICY ANALYSIS, THEREFORE, IS ABOUT COMBINING SOCIAL INTERACTION WITH INTELLECTUAL COGITATION. MY PREFERENCE FOR INTERACTION RATHER THAN COGITATION, FOR MORE *ASKING* AND LESS *TELLING,* FOR POLITICS OVER PLANNING, IS NOT MEANT TO PROTECT INTER- 
992 |a ACTION FROM SCRUTINY AS IF IT WERE A DOGMA. ON THE CONTRARY, SKEPTICISM SHOULD EXTEND ESPECIALLY TO INTERACTION*HOW IT DEVELOPS, WHAT SUSTAINS IT, WHY IT PRODUCES OUTCOMES, ITS CLASS AND IDEOLOGICAL BIASES, WHEN IT SHOULD BE CHANGED*PRECISELY BECAUSE WE BEGIN BY INTENDING TO RELY ON IT. IN A WORD, THE MAIN TASK OF RESPONSIBLE INTELLECTUAL COGITATION IS TO MONITOR, APPRAISE, MODIFY, AND OTHERWISE STRENGTHEN SOCIAL INTERACTION. AND THIS REQUIREMENT (A RESPONSIBILITY, REALLY, FOR A DEMOCRACY IN WHICH POPULAR PREFERENCES SHOULD MATTER) HOLDS TRUE IF ONE IS AN ANALYST ACTING AS A CITIZEN OR A CITIZEN DOING ANALYSIS. ANALYSTS ACT AS CITIZENS (SEE CHAP. 15 ON URBAN SERVICES) WHEN THEY BRING TO LIGHT DEVIATIONS OF ACTUAL POLICY OUTCOMES FROM ACCEPTED NORMS. SEEK AND YE SHALL FIND! CHOICE DETERMINES WHICH DISCREPANCIES TO BRING TO LIGHT. CITIZENS ACT AS ANALYSTS WHEN THEY TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY PERFORMANCE BY COMPARING WHAT THEY RECEIVE FOR WHAT THEY PUT IN, BY LEARNING TO REFINE THEIR PREFERENCES, AND BY DEVEL- OPING MORALLY IN CONNECTING WHAT THEY DO TO WHAT OTHER PEOPLE WANT. MORALITY IN POLICY ANALYSIS WHATEVER THE COMBINATION, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER REMAINS THE IDEAL OF ANALYSTS WHO HOPE THEY HAVE TRUTH, BUT REALIZE THEY HAVE NOT (AND, IN A DEMOCRACY, SHOULD NOT HAVE) POWER. NO ONE CAN DO ANALYSIS WITHOUT BECOMING AWARE THAT MORAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE INTEGRAL TO THE ENTERPRISE. XLIV INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART AFTER ALL, ANALYSIS IS ABOUT WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE, ABOUT MAKING THINGS BETTER, NOT WORSE. I HAVE NEVER BEEN SYMPATHETIC TO THE VIEW THAT FACTS AND VALUES, EXCEPT AS INTELLECTUAL CONSTRUCTS, EITHER ARE OR OUGHT TO BE KEPT SEPARATE IN ACTION. IN WHAT, THEN, DOES THE MORALITY OF THE ANALYST CONSIST? ARE POLICY ANALYSTS *HIRED GUNS* PAID TO DO THE BIDDING OF THEIR CLIENTS, WHATEVER THAT MIGHT BE? SHOULD THEY SUBVERT THEIR SUPERIORS FOR A HIGHER CAUSE? DISCOVERING THAT A REQUIRED COURSE ON MORAL DIMENSIONS OF POLICY ANALYSIS 
992 |a IN BERKELEY (WHEN DO YOU RESIGN? WHO DO YOU SERVE? HOW CAN MORAL IMPLICATIONS BE MADE MORE EXPLICIT IN ANALYSIS?) DID NOT SATISFY A LONG- ING TO BE PROVED VIRTUOUS, I MADE OUR STUDENTS A STANDING OFFER: WHEN IN DOUBT, THE *DEAN OF MORALITY* WOULD PROVIDE INSTANT REPLIES ABOUT WHICH ACTIONS UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WERE MORAL. 7 SOME QUESTIONS ARE EASY TO ANSWER. ANALYSTS SHOULD NOT ABUSE A CLIENT*S TRUST BY WORKING SUB ROSA FOR OTHERS WHO ARE BELIEVED TO BE MORE DESERVING. OTHER QUESTIONS ARE MORE DIFFICULT. IF A STUDY SHOWS THAT A PROGRAM SUPPORTED BY A WORTHY GROUP WITH WHOM THE ANALYST IDENTIFIES LACKS POSITIVE RESULTS, SHOULD THAT CONCLU- SION BE MADE KNOWN? YES, OF COURSE, THOUGH IF THE PERSONAL DISCOMFORT IS EXCESSIVE, THE ANALYST MAY WISH TO MOVE TO OTHER SUBJECTS. SUPPOSE, HOWEVER, THE PROGRAM AS A WHOLE APPEARS DESIRABLE BUT CONTAINS FLAWS. IS THE ANALYST DUTY-BOUND TO REVEAL FAULTS NOT ONLY TO CLIENTS, BUT, WHEN CHAL- LENGED, TO ADVERSARIES AS WELL? ANALYSIS, WHICH IS IN PART RHETORIC, SHOULD BE PERSUASIVE. PRESENTING A PREFERRED POLICY IN THE MOST PERSUASIVE MAN- NER, BY FINDING ARGUMENTS THAT WILL APPEAL TO OTHERS, IS NOT ONLY PERSONALLY PERMISSIBLE BUT ALSO SOCIALLY DESIRABLE. ONE PROMISE OF POLICY ANALYSIS IS THAT THROUGH REPEATED INTERACTIONS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS (THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY, OF COURSE, COMMON POSITIONS) WILL GROW, SO THAT ACTION WILL BE BETTER INFORMED. STILL GREATER DIFFICULTIES ARISE. WHAT THE ANALYST DOES IN ONE SITUATION OFTEN IS CONNECTED WITH OPPORTUNITIES TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE IN OTHERS. SHOULD ANALYSIS BE MODERATED OR EVEN WITHHELD IF ACTION TAKEN IN THIS INSTANCE WOULD DAMAGE FUTURE PROSPECTS? CLEARLY, CAREFUL BALANCING IS RE - REQUIRED. HERE, HOWEVER, THE *DEAN OF MORALITY*S* OFFER TO DECIDE THE MATTER WAS REJECTED. *WHO SET YOU UP AS OUR GRAND INQUISITOR?* STUDENTS ASKED. *AFTER ALL, WE HAVE OUR OWN MORAL SENSIBILITIES AND ARE ABLE TO TAKE OUR OWN RISKS.* AND SO YOU HAVE AND SO YOU ARE. 
992 |a SUPPOSE YOU ARE WORKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE IN ORDER TO BE PERSUASIVE IN RECOMMENDING BILLIONS FOR INNER-CITY URBAN AREAS. WHEN WITHIN STRIK- ING DISTANCE, SHOULD YOU OPPOSE THE PRESIDENT ON ISRAEL OR CONDEMN HIS XLV INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART PROPOSALS ON CIVIL SERVICE REFORM, RENDERING SUSPECT YOUR ADVICE ON URBAN AID? ANALYSTS MUST NOT LIE BUT THEY MAY BE SILENT. STILL, THERE MUST BE AND THERE ARE, LIMITS: EVERYTHING IS NOT ALLOWED . JUST AS SCIENCE CANNOT TOLERATE MOB RULE, IN WHICH CLAIMS ARE SETTLED BY FORCE, OR NIHILISM, IN WHICH EVERY CLAIM IS AS GOOD (OR BAD) AS EVERY OTHER JUST BECAUSE IT IS MADE, SO POLICY ANALYSIS, WITHOUT BEING SELF-DEFEATING, CANNOT BE BASED ON VIOLENCE OR FRAUD. THE MORE VIOLENCE, THE LESS INFORMATION, AS COERCION DISPLACES COGITATION AND INTIMIDATION REPLACES INTERACTION. ACTION THAT APPEARS TO BE INDIVIDUAL IS ACTUALLY MASS MANIPULATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ABSENCE OF FORCE DOES NOT GUARANTEE THE PRESENCE OF AUTHENTIC EXPRES- SION. THAT DEPENDS ON, AMONG OTHER THINGS, SELF-AWARENESS AND SOCIAL TRUST. INTERACTION CANNOT OPERATE IF SOCIAL ACTORS WITHHOLD THEIR TRUE PREFER- ENCES AND COGITATION CANNOT CALCULATE ON FALSE DATA. ALTHOUGH THESE NORMS REJECTING FORCE AND FRAUD MAY APPEAR OVERLY DRAMATIC WHEN BALDLY STATED, THEY ARE, IN FACT, QUIETLY INCLUDED UNDER ACCEPTED MODES OF CRAFTSMANSHIP. DESIGNING PROBLEMS IS AN ART BUT JUSTIFYING SOLUTIONS IS A CRAFT AMENABLE TO VARIOUS CONVENTIONS: SOME DISTINGUISH WORK OF QUALITY AND OTHERS SELECT FORUMS FOR SECURING AGREEMENT ON WHAT COUNTS AS EVIDENCE. THE DETAILED BIBLICAL DIRECTIONS FOR BUILDING THE TEMPLE, SPECIFYING QUALITY OF MATERIAL AND WORKMANSHIP, AS WELL AS THE ENDLESSLY ELABORATED PROCEDURES FOR PRE- PARING WHALES IN MELVILLE*S MOBY DICK , ARE REMINDERS THAT THE MORALITY OF ORDINARY PEOPLE LIKE US (BUT NOT LIKE MOSES OR AHAB) CONSISTS OF MAINTAIN- ING THE QUALITY OF EVERYDAY ACTIVITY THAT IS CRAFTSMANSHIP. HIGH STANDARDS 
992 |a AND HEALTHY HABITS ARE PROTECTION AGAINST THE DEMONIC. TO BE SURE, THERE CAN BE NO GUARANTEE THAT TRUTH WILL BE DISCOVERED OR, IF IT IS, THAT IT WILL MAKE MANKIND FREE OR EVEN INCREASE AGREEMENT RATHER THAN CONFLICT. BUT MAINTAINING ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS FOR CONVINCING OTHERS (INCLUDING NOT LYING TO ONESELF) IS SURELY SUPERIOR TO DOING THE OPPOSITE. WHAT ABOUT ME? WILL I MAKE GOOD MY PROMISE TO TELL THE TRUTH ABOUT ANALYSIS OF POLICY? MAYBE. IT DEPENDS NOT ONLY ON WHAT I HAVE TO SAY BUT ALSO ON WHAT YOU ARE LOOKING FOR. SUPPOSE I SUMMARIZE: ANALYSIS IS DESCRIP- TIVE IN THAT IT IS DESIGNED TO EXPLAIN HOW A DIFFICULTY HAS COME ABOUT. ANALYSIS IS PRESCRIPTIVE IN THAT IT AIMS TO GIVE ADVICE ON WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. ANALYSIS MUST BE SELECTIVE , THEREFORE, IN THAT IT IS ORIENTED TO PARTICULAR PEOPLE (IN SPECIFIC SLOTS WITHIN LOCATABLE LEVELS OF AN ORGANIZATION) WHO HAVE THE AUTHORITY, MONEY, AND OTHER RESOURCES REQUIRED TO DO WHAT IS RECOM- MENDED. ANALYSIS MAY BE OBJECTIVE BY GETTING PEOPLE TO AGREE ON THE CONSE- QUENCES OF A VARIETY OF ALTERNATIVES. INSOFAR AS IT IS RELEVANT TO FUTURE CHOICES, HOWEVER, ANALYSIS INEVITABLY IS ARGUMENTATIVE , LEANING TOWARD THIS VIEW AND XLVI INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART REJECTING THAT OTHER ONE. THE ABILITY TO RATIONALIZE IS NOT TO BE REJECTED ONCE IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE CAPACITY TO CONVINCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR SOCIAL SUPPORT. ANALYSIS IS RETROSPECTIVE BECAUSE IT INVOLVES ESTABLISHING A VIEW OF THE PAST (THIS IS WHY WE NEED CHANGE) THAT WILL JUSTIFY A DESIRED FUTURE. BUT, I HAVE SAID ALSO THAT ANALYSIS IS INVENTIVE , REPRESENTING A CREATIVE JUXTAPOSITION BETWEEN RESOURCES AND OBJECTIVES. ANALYSIS IS PROSPECTIVE , SEEKING ITS REWARDS IN THE FUTURE, WHICH IS ALWAYS IN DOUBT. ANALYSIS MUST ALSO BE SUBJECTIVE , THEREFORE, IN THAT THE CHOICE OF PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED, AS WELL AS THE ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED, IS NOT SPECIFIED BUT MUST BE WORKED OUT BY PARTICULAR PEOPLE WITH INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS. 
992 |a IS ANALYSIS, THEN, A UNION OF OPPOSITES*PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE, OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE, DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE*OR, DIFFERENT THINGS UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES? BOTH. AS PHILOSOPHERS OF SCIENCE SAY OF DISCOVERY (ORIGINS OF IDEAS AND THEIR FORMATION INTO THEORIES, WHICH WE CALL POLICIES), ANALYSIS IS INDEED AN ART. BUT AS WE PROCEED TO JUSTIFICATION (WHY WE SHOULD TENTATIVELY ACCEPT EVI- DENCE), RULES OF CRAFTSMANSHIP BECOME MORE IMPORTANT. DISTINCTIONS MAY BE MADE BETWEEN WORK THAT IS BETTER AND WORSE ON SUCH GROUNDS AS INCLU- SION OF VARIABLES THAT CAN BE USED BY DECISION-MAKERS, SENSITIVITY OF DESIGN TO DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTATION, VIABILITY OF ASSUMPTIONS, AND ANTICIPATION OF COUNTERARGUMENT. HOW POLICY IS CREATED MAY BE A PRIVATE AFFAIR, BUT WHETHER IT IS JUSTIFIED IS PART OF A PUBLIC PROCEEDING. BY THIS TIME SUSPICION DAWNS: THERE CAN BE NO ONE DEFINITION OF POLICY ANALYSIS. AS OLD-TIME COOKS USED TO SAY WHEN ASKED HOW MUCH SPICE A RECIPE REQUIRED, *AS MUCH AS IT TAKES.* POLICY ANALYSIS IS AN APPLIED SUBFIELD WHOSE CONTENT CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARIES BUT BY WHATEVER APPEARS APPROPRIATE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TIME AND THE NATURE OF PROBLEM. WHEN CONFRONTED BY EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS, MY FATHER WOULD TELL THE STORY OF HOW YOSHKE ANSWERED AN ADVERTISEMENT CALLING FOR A BUTLER WHO HAD HIS OWN LIVERY, COULD PILOT AN AIRPLANE, SPEAK FRENCH, AND SET TABLE FOR FULL SERVICE. WHEN THE MAJOR-DOMO ASKED ABOUT LIVERY, YOSHKE SAID HE PREFERRED UNDERWEAR. COULD HE FLY A PLANE? ACTUALLY, HE EVEN GOT SICK IN CARS. DID HE SPEAK FRENCH? HIS ENGLISH WASN*T REALLY THAT GOOD. COULD HE SET TABLE? MAYBE ONE KNIFE AND FORK. BY THIS TIME, THE MAJOR - DOMO WAS GETTING ANGRY: WHY HAD YOSHKE COME IF HE EVIDENTLY LACKED EVERY QUALIFICATION? *WELL,* YOSHKE SAID, *I CAME TO TELL YOU, ON ME YOU SHOULDN*T DEPEND.* DO NOT ASK FROM ME WHAT YOU SHOULD NOT WANT*A DEFINITIVE DEFINITION 
992 |a OF POLICY ANALYSIS GOOD FOR ALL TIMES, PLACES, AND CIRCUMSTANCES. IF YOU ARE XLVII INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART LOOKING FOR THE SECRET OF ANALYSIS, YOU WILL NOT FIND THAT HERE (OR ANY-WHERE ELSE, FOR THAT MATTER) BUT IF YOU WANT TO DEBATE ABOUT DIFFERENT WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT PUBLIC POLICY, I HOPE THIS BOOK IS A GOOD PLACE TO BEGIN. THE ART OF POLICY ANALYSIS POLICY ANALYSIS IS AN ART. ITS SUBJECTS ARE PUBLIC PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE SOLVED AT LEAST TENTATIVELY TO BE UNDERSTOOD. PIET HEIN PUT THIS THOUGHT - TWISTER, 8 *ART IS THE SOLVING OF PROBLEMS THAT CANNOT BE EXPRESSED UNTIL THEY ARE SOLVED.* POLICY ANALYSIS MUST CREATE PROBLEMS THAT DECISION- MAKERS ARE ABLE TO HANDLE WITH THE VARIABLES UNDER THEIR CONTROL AND IN THE TIME AVAILABLE. ONLY BY SPECIFYING A DESIRED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANIPULABLE MEANS AND OBTAINABLE OBJECTIVES CAN ANALYSTS MAKE THE ESSENTIAL DISTINC- TION*BETWEEN A PUZZLE THAT CAN BE SOLVED DEFINITIVELY, ONCE ALL THE PIECES ARE PUT IN PLACE, AND A PROBLEM FOR WHICH THERE MAY NOT BE A PROGRAM- MATIC SOLUTION. THE TECHNICAL BASE OF POLICY ANALYSIS IS WEAK. IN PART ITS LIMITATIONS ARE THOSE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: INNUMERABLE DISCRETE PROPOSITIONS, OF VARYING VALIDITY AND UNCERTAIN APPLICABILITY, OCCASIONALLY TOUCHING BUT NOT NECES- SARILY RELATED, LIKE BEADS ON A STRING. ITS STRENGTHS LIE IN THE ABILITY TO MAKE A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE GO A LONG WAY BY COMBINING AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE SITUATION WITH THE ABILITY TO EXPLORE THE ENVIRONMENT CONSTRUCTIVELY. UNLIKE SOCIAL SCIENCE, HOWEVER, POLICY ANALYSIS MUST BE PRE- SCRIPTIVE; ARGUMENTS ABOUT CORRECT POLICY, WHICH DEAL WITH THE FUTURE, CAN- NOT HELP BUT BE WILLFUL AND THEREFORE POLITICAL. ANALYSIS IS IMAGINATION. MAKING BELIEVE THE FUTURE HAS HAPPENED IN THE PAST, ANALYSTS TRY TO EXAMINE EVENTS AS IF THOSE ACTIONS ALREADY HAD OCCURRED. THEY ARE STRONGLY COMMITTED TO *THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS,* IN WHICH THEY IMAGINE WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN ORDER TO IMPROVE WHAT MAY COME TO 
992 |a PASS. THEORIES ARE DISCARDED INSTEAD OF PEOPLE. NATURALLY, THIS IS RISKY. OFTEN WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE WE HAVE BEEN, LET ALONE WHERE WE WOULD LIKE TO GO OR HOW TO GET THERE. RETRODICTION (*PREDICTING THE PAST*) MAY BE AS MUCH IN DISPUTE AS PREDICTION. BECAUSE WHAT OUR PAST SHOULD HAVE BEEN, AS WELL AS WHAT OUR FUTURE OUGHT TO BE, IS DEFINED BY DIFFERING VALUES, ONE PER- SON*S ANALYTIC MEAT MAY BE POISON TO ANOTHER. FOLLOWING THE PRACTICES OF THE ANALYTIC CRAFT*NORMS FOR DISCIPLINING PRIVATE IMAGINATION BY MAKING IT MORE PUBLICLY ASSESSABLE*CAN REDUCE BUT CANNOT ELIMINATE DISAGREEMENT OVER FUTURE CONSEQUENCES THAT NO ONE HAS YET EXPERIENCED. POLICIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED NOT AS ETERNAL TRUTHS BUT AS HYPOTHESES SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION AND REPLACEMENT BY BETTER ONES UNTIL THESE IN TURN ARE DISCARDED. DOGMA IS DELETERIOUS; SKEPTICISM IS SOUND. YET DOGMA IS XLVIII INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART INDISPENSABLE; WITHOUT TAKING SOME THINGS FOR GRANTED SOME OF THE TIME, EVERYTHING IS IN FLUX SO THAT NOTHING COMES AMENABLE TO EXAMINATION. DRAWING THE BALANCE IS NOT EASY: HOW MUCH DOGMA VERSUS HOW MUCH SKEPTICISM? THE GOOD ORGANIZATION IS DEVOTED TO CORRECTING ERRORS, BUT IS SUBJECT TO EXHAUSTION ITSELF IF IT DOES NOT REJECT A HIGH PROPORTION OF THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ITS CURRENT PRACTICES. ANYONE WHO KNOWS CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION WILL ACKNOWLEDGE THAT. ERROR CORRECTION ITSELF HAS TO BE TRADED OFF AGAINST ERROR RECOGNITION, FOR THE VERY VISIBILITY OF ERROR, WHICH FACILITATES DETEC- TION, IS CORRELATED WITH LARGE SIZE, WHICH MAKES CORRECTION DIFFICULT. THE WIDELY ACKNOWLEDGED ERROR IN INDEXING SOCIAL SECURITY AGAINST BOTH WAGES AND PRICES IS EASY TO SPOT BECAUSE ITS COST IS HUGE, BUT DIFFICULT TO END BECAUSE SO MANY MILLIONS BENEFIT. WHETHER ERRORS ARE RECOGNIZED OR ELIMI- NATED DEPENDS ON THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE WHO PARTICIPATE IN PRODUCING POLICY. PEOPLE MAKE PROBLEMS. HOW ARE THEY TO BE ENCOURAGED TO DO THE RIGHT 
992 |a THING? HOW DOES ONE INDIVIDUAL KNOW WHAT IS RIGHT FOR OTHERS? WHAT GIVES ANYONE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE FOR OTHERS? HOW ARE PREFERENCES SHAPED AND EXPRESSED? ONE WAY OF SHAPING AND EXPRESSING IS TO ASK PEOPLE, AND ANOTHER IS TO TELL THEM. *ASKING* MEANS SETTING UP INSTITUTIONS, SUCH AS VOTING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE AND BARGAINING OVER PRICES, TO HELP PEOPLE EVOLVE PREFERENCES. *TELLING* MEANS DECIDING INTELLECTUALLY WHAT IS GOOD FOR PEO- PLE AND MOVING THEM IN A PREDETERMINED SEQUENCE TOWARD A PRESELECTED DESTINATION. ASKING (WHICH WE WILL CALL SOCIAL INTERACTION OR JUST PLAIN POLI- TICS) AND TELLING (INTELLECTUAL COGITATION OR JUST PLAIN PLANNING) BOTH BELONG IN POLICY ANALYSIS. WHEN THINGS GO WRONG, ANALYSTS, AT LEAST IN A DEMOCRACY, PLAY POLITICS. BY ALTERING THE FRANCHISE OR BY IMPOSING A COST CONSTRAINT OR BY MAKING MONOPOLY LESS LIKELY, ANALYSTS SEEK TO ADJUST INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION SO AS TO SECURE BETTER BEHAVIOR. PLANNING IS PREFERABLE WHEN INTERACTION IS NOT FEASIBLE, BECAUSE PEOPLE CAN*T GET TOGETHER, OR WHEN IT IS UNDESIRABLE, BECAUSE PEOPLE MIGHT MAKE MORALLY IMPERMISSIBLE CHOICES. THE HIGHEST FORM OF ANALYSIS IS USING INTELLECT TO AID INTERACTION BETWEEN PEOPLE. POLICY ANALYSIS, THEN, IS ABOUT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PEOPLE. WHEN WE LIKE THE RESULTS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN DOCTORS AND PATIENTS OR TEACHERS AND STUDENTS, WE REINFORCE OUR APPROVAL OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH SUCH PERSONS COME TOGETHER. WHEN WE DON*T APPROVE, WE TRY TO ALTER THESE RELATIONSHIPS. MAJOR CHANGES TAKE PLACE WHEN WE SHIFT XLIX INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS AS ART THE PATTERN OF RELATIONSHIPS (BY PAYING DOCTORS THROUGH GOVERNMENT, OR GIVING PARENTS VOUCHERS ENABLING THEM TO CHOOSE PUBLIC SCHOOLS) SO THAT OUTCOMES CHANGE. THINKING ABOUT ANALYSIS AS RELATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLE MUCH LIKE US*NOT AS STRANGE SYMBOLS OR DESICCATED DOLLAR SIGNS*IS NOT ONLY MORE HUMANE BUT ALSO MORE ACCURATE. POLICY ANALYSIS, TO BE BRIEF, IS AN ACTIVITY CREATING PROBLEMS THAT CAN 
992 |a BE SOLVED. EVERY POLICY IS FASHIONED OF TENSION BETWEEN RESOURCES AND OBJECTIVES, PLANNING AND POLITICS, SKEPTICISM AND DOGMA. SOLVING PROBLEMS INVOLVES TEMPORARILY RESOLVING THESE TENSIONS. BUT, IF TENSIONS DO NOT HAVE AN END, THEY MUST HAVE A BEGINNING: WHAT SOCIAL FORCES DO THEY REFLECT? OBJECTIVES MAY BE INFINITE BUT RESOURCES ARE NOT; SCARCITY OF RESOURCES IS UBIQUITOUS. OBJECTIVES, THEREFORE, MUST BE LIM- ITED BY RESOURCES; WHAT ONE TRIES TO DO DEPENDS ON WHAT ONE HAS TO DO IT WITH. BUT THIS DOES NOT ALWAYS MEAN THAT RESOURCES ARE ALWAYS GOOD, SO TO SPEAK, BECAUSE THEY EXIST AND OBJECTIVES ARE BAD, BECAUSE THEY EXCEED WHAT IS AVAILABLE. ON THE CONTRARY, OBJECTIVES MAY DEMAND TOO LITTLE (SEE CHAP. 14 , *A TAX BY ANY OTHER NAME* AND CHAP. 15 , *THE DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN SERVICES*) SO THAT RESOURCES FLOW IN THE WRONG DIRECTION. HOW DOGMATIC AND HOW SKEPTICAL ONE IS ABOUT POLICIES AND THE WAY THEY ARE PRODUCED*WHO GETS WHAT AND WHY, AS LASSWELL SAID*IS A MEASURE OF TRUST IN SOCIAL RELATIONS. WHAT ONE LIKES MAY DEPEND ON HOW ONE DOES. A RECORD OF SUCCESS IN ECONOMIC MARKETS WOULD NATURALLY INCREASE CONFI- DENCE IN THAT FORM OF ENCOUNTER. COGITATION MAY APPEAL MORE TO GROUPS THAT GAIN LESS FROM INTERACTION. THE TENSIONS ABOUT WHICH WE TALK, THEN, ARE SOCIAL AS WELL AS INTELLECTUAL; THEY ARE ABOUT POWER IN SOCIETY AS WELL AS ANALYSIS OF POLICY. THE LIST OF THE GOALS ONE IS NOT ATTEMPTING TO REACH IS NECESSARILY MUCH LARGER THAN THOSE ONE DOES TRY FOR. I MAKE NO PRETENSE OF WRITING A *HOW- TO-DO-IT* BOOK, OTHER THAN BY ILLUSTRATING FORMS ANALYSIS CAN TAKE. THIS BOOK IS COMPARATIVE IN THAT I COMPARE A WIDE RANGE OF AMERICAN DOMESTIC POLICIES, BUT IT IS NOT EXHAUSTIVE (BY NO MEANS DOES IT INCLUDE ALL OR MOST POLICIES) OR INTERNATIONAL (I DO NOT DISCUSS EXPERIENCES ABROAD). MY IMPRES- SION IS THAT WEST EUROPEAN NATIONS ARE NO MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN WE ARE IN MOST OF DOMESTIC POLICY; THE BIG DIFFERENCE IS THAT AMERICA PUBLICIZES ITS 

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