Competition policy: theory and practice

The book is written to appeal to practitioners and students, to lawyers and economists. It is not only a textbook in economics for first-year graduate or advanced undergraduate courses, but also a book for all those who wish to understand competition issues in a clear and rigorous way. Exercises and... Ausführliche Beschreibung

Parallele Ausgabe: Auch als: Competition policy
1. Person: Motta, Massimo
Format: E-Buch
Genre: Lehrbuch
Sprache: English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 2009
Beschreibung: XXIII, 616 S. graph. Darst.
Ausgabe: 12. pr.
Serien: Cambridge Books Online
Schlagworte (SWD): Wettbewerbspolitik
Schlagworte (STW): Internationaler Wettbewerb
Kartellrecht
Konzentrationspolitik
Theorie
Welt
Wettbewerbspolitik
Wettbewerbstheorie
Schlagworte (SH): Antitrust law
Competition
Competition > Government policy
Competition, International
Industrial policy
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992 |a COMPETITION POLICY THEORY AND PRACTICE MASSIMO MOTTA EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE AND UNIVERSITAET POMPEU FABRA, BARCELONA CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES PAGE XIII LIST OF TABLES XV PREFACE XVII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XXI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS XXIII 1 COMPETITION POLICY: HISTORY, OBJECTIVES, AND THE LAW 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.2 BRIEF HISTORY OF COMPETITION POLICY 1 1.2.1 ANTI-TRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1 1.2.2 COMPETITION LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 9 1.3 OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION POLICY AND OTHER PUBLIC POLICIES 17 1.3.1 OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION POLICY 17 1.3.2 OTHER PUBLIC POLICY FACTORS AFFECTING COMPETITION 26 1.3.3 COMPETITION POLICY: A DEFINITION 30 1.4 THE MAIN FEATURES OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 30 1.4.1 ARTICLE 81: HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL AGREEMENTS 31 1.4.2 ARTICLE 82: ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION 34 1.4.3 MERGERS 36 1.5 EXERCISES 38 2 MARKET POWER AND WELFARE: INTRODUCTION 39 2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 39 2.2 ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY 40 2.2.1 MARKET POWER: A DEFINITION 40 2.2.2 THE ALLOCATIVE INEFFICIENCY OF A MONOPOLY 41 2.2.3 RENT-SEEKING ACTIVITIES 44 2.3 PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY 45 2.3.1 ADDITIONAL WELFARE LOSS FROM PRODUCTIVE INEFFICIENCY 46 2.3.2 WHY IS A MONOPOLIST LESS EFFICIENT? 46 2.3.3 NUMBER OF FIRMSAND WELFARE 51 VIII CONTENTS 2.3.4 CONCLUSIONS 52 2.3.5 COMPETITION AND PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY* 52 2.4 DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 55 2.4.1 THE LOWER INCENTIVES TO MONOPOLIST INNOVATION 56 2.4.2 INCENTIVES TO INVEST IN R&D 58 2.4.3 MODELS OF COMPETITION AND INNOVATION* 58 2.5 PUBLIC POLICIES AND INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE 64 2.5.1 EX ANTE V. EX POST: PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION 65 2.5.2 ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 66 2.5.3 PRICE CONTROLS AND STRUCTURAL REMEDIES 69 2.5.4 INTERNAL V. EXTERNAL GROWTH 70 2.6 MONOPOLY: WILL THE MARKET FIX IT ALL? 70 2.6.1 DURABLE GOOD MONOPOLIST 71 2.6.2 CONTESTABLE MARKETS 73 2.6.3 MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTRY 75 2.7 SUMMARY AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS 89 2.8 EXERCISES 89 2.8.1 SOLUTIONS TO EXERCISES 94 
992 |a MARKET DEFINITION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF MARKET POWER 101 3.1 INTRODUCTION 101 3.2 MARKET DEFINITION 102 3.2.1 PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION 102 3.2.2 GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION 113 3.3 THE ASSESSMENT OF MARKET POWER 115 3.3.1 TRADITIONAL APPROACH: (INDIRECT) ASSESSMENT OF MARKET POWER 117 3.3.2 ECONOMETRIC TECHNIQUES: (DIRECT) ASSESSMENT OF MARKET POWER* 124 3.4 EXERCISES 134 3.4.1 SOLUTIONS TO EXERCISES 135 COLLUSION AND HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS 137 4.1 INTRODUCTION 137 4.1.1 WHAT IS COLLUSION? 138 4.2 FACTORS THAT FACILITATE COLLUSION 142 4.2.1 STRUCTURAL FACTORS 142 4.2.2 PRICE TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 150 4.2.3 PRICING RULES AND CONTRACTS 156 4.2.4 ANALYSIS OF COLLUSION: CONCLUSIONS 159 4.2.5 FACTORS THAT FACILITATE COLLUSION* 159 4.3 ADVANCED MATERIAL** 167 4.3.1 CREDIBILITY OF PUNISHMENT AND OPTIMAL PENAL CODES** 167 4.3.2 CARTELS AND RENEGOTIATION** 171 CONTENTS IX 4.3.3 THE GREEN - PORTER (1984) MODEL** 175 4.3.4 SYMMETRY AND COLLUSION** 178 4.4 PRACTICE: WHAT SHOULD BE LEGAL AND WHAT ILLEGAL? 185 4.4.1 STANDARDS OF PROOF: MARKET DATA V. HARD EVIDENCE 185 4.4.2 EX ANTE COMPETITION POLICIES AGAINST COLLUSION 190 4.4.3 EX POST COMPETITION POLICIES AGAINST COLLUSION 192 4.5 JOINT-VENTURES AND OTHER HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS 202 4.5.1 JOINT-VENTURES 202 4.5.2 RESEARCH JOINT-VENTURES 203 4.5.3 OTHER FORMS OF CO-OPERATION REGARDING TECHNOLOGY 206 4.5.4 CO-OPERATIVE R&D* 208 4.6 A CASE OF PARALLEL BEHAVIOUR: WOOD PULP 211 4.7 EXERCISES 219 4.7.1 SOLUTIONS TO EXERCISES 224 HORIZONTAL MERGERS 231 5.1 INTRODUCTION 231 5.2 UNILATERAL EFFECTS 233 5.2.1 ABSENT EFFICIENCIES, A MERGER INCREASES MARKET POWER 233 5.2.2 VARIABLES WHICH AFFECT UNILATERAL MARKET POWER 234 5.2.3 EFFICIENCY GAINS 238 5.2.4 MODELLING UNILATERAL EFFECTS OF MERGERS* 243 5.3 PRO-COLLUSIVE EFFECTS 250 5.3.1 FACTORS WHICH AFFECT COLLUSION (REMINDER) 251 5.3.2 EFFICIENCY GAINS AND PRO-COLLUSIVE EFFECTS 252 5.4 A MORE GENERAL MODEL** 252 5.4.1 THE MODEL 252 
992 |a 5.4.2 UNILATERAL EFFECTS, WITHOUT EFFICIENCY GAINS 253 5.4.3 EFFICIENCY GAINS FROM MERGERS 257 5.4.4 EFFICIENCY OFFENCE: WHEN THE MERGER LEADS TO THE EXIT OF THE OUTSIDERS 261 5.4.5 PROOFS 263 5.5 MERGER REMEDIES 265 5.5.1 DIVESTITURES 266 5.5.2 BEHAVIOURAL REMEDIES 268 5.6 MERGER POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 270 5.6.1 DOMINANCE TEST 271 5.6.2 THE TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCY GAINS 273 5.6.3 CONCLUSIONS 276 5.7 CASE STUDIES 277 5.7.1 HOW TO PROCEED IN MERGER CASES 278 5.7.2 NESTU/PERRIER 279 5.7.3 ABB/DAIMLER-BENZ 286 5.8 EXERCISES 292 5.8.1 SOLUTIONS TO EXERCISES 295 X CONTENTS VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND VERTICAL MERGERS 302 6.1 WHAT ARE VERTICAL RESTRAINTS? 302 6.1.1 PLAN OF THE CHAPTER 305 6.2 INTRA-BRAND COMPETITION 306 6.2.1 DOUBLE MARGINALISATION 307 6.2.2 HORIZONTAL EXTERNALITY: FREE-RIDING IN THE PROVISION OF SERVICES 313 6.2.3 A MORE GENERAL TREATMENT* 323 6.2.4 OTHER EFFICIENCY REASONS FOR VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND VERTICAL MERGERS 333 6.2.5 VERTICAL RESTRAINTS, VERTICAL MERGERS, AND THE COMMITMENT PROBLEM 338 6.2.6 CONCLUSIONS 347 6.3 INTER-BRAND COMPETITION 347 6.3.1 STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 348 6.3.2 VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AS COLLUSIVE DEVICES 358 6.4 ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS: LEVERAGE AND FORECLOSURE 362 6.4.1 ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS: EXCLUSIVE DEALING 363 6.4.2 EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS OF VERTICAL MERGERS 372 6.5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 377 6.6 CASES 378 6.6.1 GENERAL ELECTRIC/HONEYWELL 379 6.6.2 ICE-CREAM 391 6.7 EXERCISES 398 6.7.1 SOLUTIONS TO EXERCISES 403 PREDATION, MONOPOLISATION, AND OTHER ABUSIVE PRACTICES 411 7.1 INTRODUCTION 411 7.2 PREDATORY PRICING 412 7.2.1 PREDATION: SEARCH FOR A THEORY 413 7.2.2 RECENT THEORIES OF PREDATORY PRICING 415 7.2.3 MODELS OF PREDATORY PRICING* 422 7.2.4 PRACTICE: HOW TO DEAL WITH PREDATORY PRICING ALLEGATIONS 442 7.3 NON-PRICE MONOPOLISATION PRACTICES 454 7.3.1 STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS 454 7.3.2 BUNDLING AND TYING 460 7.3.3 INCOMPATIBILITY AND OTHER STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES 483 
992 |a 7.3.4 REFUSAL TO SUPPLY AND EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS (REMINDER) 490 7.3.5 RAISING RIVALS' COSTS 490 7.4 PRICE DISCRIMINATION 491 7.4.1 WELFARE EFFECTS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 493 7.4.2 PRICE DISCRIMINATION* 502 CONTENTS XI 7.5 US V.MICROSOFT 511 7.5.1 A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE 511 7.5.2 MONOPOLISATION 513 7.5.3 ATTEMPTED MONOPOLISATION 520 7.5.4 TYING 520 7.5.5 REMEDIES 522 7.5.6 CONCLUSIONS 522 7.5.7 THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT ON REMEDIES 523 7.6 EXERCISES 524 7.6.1 SOLUTIONS TO EXERCISES 528 8 A TOOLKIT: GAME THEORY AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION MODELS 533 8.1 INTRODUCTION 533 8.2 MONOPOLY 533 8.2.1 SINGLE-PRODUCT MONOPOLY 533 8.2.2 MULTI-PRODUCT MONOPOLY 535 8.3 AN INTRODUCTION TO ELEMENTARY GAME THEORY 542 8.3.1 NASH EQUILIBRIUM 543 8.3.2 DYNAMIC GAMES AND SUB-GAME PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM 548 8.4 OLIGOPOLY I: MARKET COMPETITION IN STATIC GAMES 551 8.4.1 PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION WITH HOMOGENOUS GOODS 551 8.4.2 PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION WITH (EXOGENOUSLY) DIFFERENTIATED GOODS 561 8.4.3 REPEATED PRODUCT MARKET INTERACTION 570 8.5 OLIGOPOLY II: DYNAMIC GAMES 572 8.5.1 STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS 573 8.6 APPENDIX 578 BIBLIOGRAPHY 581 REFERENCES TO CASES AND LEGISLATION 599 INDEX 605 

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