Social preferences can make imperfect sanctions work: evidence from a public good experiment

Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I test the hypothesis that imperfect sanctions may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using a linear public good wit... Ausführliche Beschreibung

1. Person: Engel, Christoph
Quelle: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2014), Vol. 108 (2014), December, S. 343 – 353
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Format: Artikel Zeitschrift
Sprache: English
Veröffentlicht: 2014
Schlagworte (STW): Öffentliche Güter
Strafe
Test
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Sanktion
Schlagworte (SH): Defaults
Beliefs
Autorenschlagworte: Imperfect sanctions
Punishment
Inequity aversion
Social value orientation
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Anmerkung: Special Issue on institutions, games, and experiments, in honor of Werner Güth
Zusammenfassung: Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I test the hypothesis that imperfect sanctions may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using a linear public good with centralized punishment, I find that participants increase contributions even if severity had been insufficient to deter a profit-maximizing individual. The more an individual is averse against exploiting others, the less it matters whether punishment was deterrent.
Systematik (JEL): C33  
C91  
D03  
H41  
K13  
K14  

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