Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism

A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness, we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in colle... Ausführliche Beschreibung

1. Person: Güth, Werner
Quelle: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2014), Vol. 108 (2014), December, S. 389 – 395
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Format: Artikel Zeitschrift
Sprache: English
Veröffentlicht: 2014
Schlagworte (STW): Mechanism design
Collective action
Kollektives Handeln
Gerechtigkeit
Mechanismus-Design-Theorie
Autorenschlagworte: Procedural fairness
Equality axiom
Public provision
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Anmerkung: Special Issue on institutions, games, and experiments, in honor of Werner Güth
Zusammenfassung: A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness, we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in collective provision, which projects are implemented, and the positive or negative payments due to the members as well as outsiders. The mechanism allows only for one community with more or less outsiders but not forming multiple communities. We justify procedural fairness but acknowledge that the outsider problem questions some of its desirable properties. Furthermore, we compare procedurally fair with optimal, e.g., welfaristic mechanism design (e.g. Myerson, 1979).
Systematik (JEL): D44  
D46  
D61  
D62  
D63  
D71  
D72  
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D74  

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