EU competition law and the information and communication technology network industries: economic versus legal concepts in pursuit of (consumer) welfare

Competition policies have long been based on a scholarly tradition focused on static models and static analysis of industrial organisation. However, recent developments in industrial organisation literature have led to significant advances, moving beyond traditional static models and a preoccupation... Ausführliche Beschreibung

1. Person: Fatur, Andrej
Format: Buch
Sprache: English
Veröffentlicht: Oxford [u.a.] Hart 2012
Beschreibung: XXV, 285 S. Ill., graph. Darst
Schlagworte (SWD): Europäische Union
Computerindustrie
Wettbewerbsrecht
Schlagworte (STW): EU-Staaten
EU-Wettbewerbsrecht
IKT-Sektor
Schlagworte (SH): Antitrust law > European Union countries
Computer industry > Law and legislation > European Union countries
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100 1 |a Fatur, Andrej 
245 0 0 |a EU competition law and the information and communication technology network industries  |b economic versus legal concepts in pursuit of (consumer) welfare  |c Andrej Fatur 
260 |a Oxford [u.a.]  |b Hart  |c 2012 
300 |a XXV, 285 S.  |b Ill., graph. Darst 
520 |a Competition policies have long been based on a scholarly tradition focused on static models and static analysis of industrial organisation. However, recent developments in industrial organisation literature have led to significant advances, moving beyond traditional static models and a preoccupation with price competition, to consider the organisation of industries in a dynamic context. This is especially important in the field of information and communication technology (ICT) network industries where competition centres on network effects, innovation and intellectual property rights, and where the key driver of consumer benefit is technological progress. Consequently, when an antitrust intervention is contemplated, a number of considerations that arise out of the specific nature of the ICT sector have to be taken into account to ensure improved consumer welfare. This book considers the adequacy of existing EU competition policy in the area of the ICT industries in the light of the findings of modern economic theory. Particular attention is given to the implications of these dynamic markets for the competitive assessment and treatment of the most common competitive harms in this area, such as non-price predatory practices, tying and bundling, co-operative standard setting, platform joint ventures and co-operative R&D. 
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650 0 |a Antitrust law  |z European Union countries 
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650 7 |a Computerindustrie  |8 4148256-6  |2 RSWK 
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699 d |a JUR / Handels-, Gesellschafts-, Unternehmens- u. sonstiges privates Wirtschaftsrecht / Wettbewerbsrecht / Kartellrecht, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen 
699 e |a JUR / Commercial law, corporate law, business law, other private commercial law / Competition law / Antitrust law, law against restraint of competition 
690 |a EU competition law 
690 |a Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht 
690 |a Wettbewerb / Recht 
690 |a Datenverarbeitungsindustrie 
690 |a Datenverarbeitung / Industrie 
690 |a Computer / Industrie 
690 |a EU countries 
690 |a EU-Länder 
690 |a EG-Staaten 
690 |a EG-Länder 
690 |a ICT industry 
690 |a Kommunikationsindustrie 
690 |a Informationstechnische Industrie 
690 |a Informationstechnische Branche 
690 |a Informations- und Kommunikationssektor 
690 |a ITK-Branche 
690 |a IKT-Industrie 
690 |a Büromaschinenindustrie 
991 |u http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/669508616.pdf  |3 Table of contents  |m Gemeinschaftsgüter Bonn  |z VIEW 
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992 |a IMAGE 1 EU COMPETITION LAW AND THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY NETWORK INDUSTRIES ECONOMIC VERSUS LEGAL CONCEPTS IN PURSUIT OF (CONSUMER) WELFARE ANDREJ FATUR •HART. PUBLISHING OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2012 IMAGE 2 CONTENTS FOREWORD V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS VII ABBREVIATIONS XV TABLE OF CASES :...:... XVII TABLE OF TREATIES, LEGISLATION AND OTHER LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS XXIII 1. INTRODUCTION 1 I. THE SUBJECT : 1 II. BACKGROUND 1 III. ROLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN COMPETITION LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS 6 IV. EU COMPETITION POLICY AND THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS 10 V. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND OUTLINE 13 2. ICT NETWORK INDUSTRIES 15 I. GENERAL 15 II. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK AND SERVICES 16 A. GENERAL 16 B. TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AND SERVICES 20 C. CABLE AND BROADCASTING NETWORKS AND SERVICES 20 D. INTERNET, INTERNET ACCESS AND INTERNET RELATED SERVICES 21 III. HARDWARE PLATFORMS 22 IV. SOFTWARE PLATFORMS 23 V. ELECTRONIC FINANCIAL SECTOR PLATFORMS 25 A. CARD-BASED PAYMENT SYSTEMS 25 (I) GENERAL 25 (II) CARD SYSTEMS 26 (III) ISSUING OF PAYMENT CARDS 27 (IV) ACQUIRING OF CARD-HOLDERS AND MERCHANTS 28 (V) ATM NETWORKS 29 B. ELECTRONIC FINANCIAL EXCHANGES WITH CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT 29 (I) ELECTRONIC FINANCIAL EXCHANGES 29 (II) CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT 30 3. THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION POLICY 32 1. MAJOR ECONOMIC THEORIES OF COMPETITION AND THEIR EVOLUTION 32 A. CLASSICAL ERA OF ANTITRUST , 32 B. STRUCTURAL ERA AND THE HARVARD SCHOOL 33 C. EFFICIENCY ERA AND THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 34 D. THE POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS AND THE ERA OF SYNTHESIS 36 II. BASIC ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK OF COMPETITION POLICY 38 A. GENERAL 38 B. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND MARKET POWER 40 IMAGE 3 X CONTENTS C. EFFICIENCY TRADE-OFFS 43 (I) ALLOCATIVE VERSUS PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCIES 43 (II) STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC EFFICIENCIES 45 D. WELFARE STANDARDS 47 (I) CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD 47 (II) TOTAL WELFARE STANDARD 49 (III) ALTERNATIVE WELFARE STANDARDS 49 
992 |a (IV) EXISTENCE OF OPTIMAL WELFARE STANDARD? 50 4. THE ECONOMICS OF THE ICT NETWORK INDUSTRIES 53 I. INTRODUCTION .-... 53 II. FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NETWORKS 53 III. THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 57 A. GENERAL 57 B. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INNOVATION 59 C. PUBLIC POLICIES AND INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE 62 D. INNOVATION IN NETWORK SYSTEMS 64 IV. MAJOR THEORIES OF ECONOMIC HARM: VERTICAL FORECLOSURE AND RAISING RIVALS' COSTS 67 A. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF VERTICAL FORECLOSURE 68 B. RAISING RIVALS COSTS AS ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF FORECLOSURE 70 V. (DYNAMIC) NATURE OF COMPETITION IN THE ICT INDUSTRIES: INTERPLAY OF NETWORKS, INNOVATION AND COMPETITION '.-. 71 A. COMPETITION IN DYNAMIC MARKETS: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION 71 (I) GENERAL 71 (II) AUSTRIAN SCHOOL'S APPROACH AND RELATED DYNAMIC THEORIES 71 (III) LIMITS OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL'S APPROACH 74 (A) INTENSIVE INNOVATION: COMPETITION OR MONOPOLY DRIVEN? 1 74 » (B) LINKS BETWEEN MARKET CONCENTRATION OR COMPANY SIZE AND INNOVATION: EMPIRICAL STUDIES 76 (C) INFLUENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL TECHNOLOGY CHARACTERISTICS ON MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION ACTIVITY 78 (D) INNOVATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE: IMPORTANCE OF COMPETITIVE PROCESS 79 B. SPECIAL ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND SOURCES OF MARKET POWER IN THE ICT INDUSTRIES 80 (I) INNOVATION AND IPRS 81 (II) NETWORK EFFECTS AND TIPPING 82 (A) TYPES OF NETWORK EFFECTS 82 (B) NETWORK EFFECTS AND NETWORK SIZE 83 (C) SUB-OPTIMAL NETWORKS: NETWORK COMPETITION, FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE AND TIPPING 85 (III) SWITCHING COSTS AND LOCK-INS 86 (IV) COMPATIBILITY AND STANDARDS 87 (V) HIGH FIXED/SUNK COSTS AND LOW MARGINAL COSTS 89 IMAGE 4 CONTENTS XI (VI) TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 91 (A) ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 91 (B) PRICING 93 (C) INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION OF TWO-SIDED MARKETS 94 C. COMPETITION IN THE MARKET VERSUS COMPETITION FOR THE MARKET: APPLICABILITY OF SCHUMPETERIAN COMPETITION TO CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPETITION IN THE ICT INDUSTRIES 96 
992 |a 5. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK, MARKET DEFINITION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF MARKET POWER 99 I. BACKGROUND ........ 99 II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND COMPETITION POLICY 100 A. CHOICE OF THE WELFARE STANDARD UNDER EU COMPETITION POLICY 102 III. APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION ANALYSIS IN THE ICT INDUSTRIES 103 A. ADEQUACY OF TRADITIONAL (STATIC) APPROACH TO COMPETITION ANALYSIS 103 B. EFFECTS- VERSUS FORM-BASED APPROACH: THE 'FIRST PRINCIPLES' APPROACH TO COMPETITION ANALYSIS 105 C. EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH: PER SE RULE VERSUS THE RULE OF REASON 106 D. PRELIMINARY SCREENING FOR POSSIBLE ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS 107 E. COMPETITIVE HARM AND CONSUMER WELFARE 108 F. GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION ASSESSMENT: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 110 IV. MARKET DEFINITION 115 A. GENERAL 115 B. MARKET DEFINITION IN THE CONTEXT OF ICT INDUSTRIES 115 C. SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES WITH THE ROLE OF MARKET DEFINITION IN THE ICT INDUSTRIES 117 (1) THE SSNIP TEST AND ICT INDUSTRIES 117 (II) CONCEPT OF INNOVATION MARKETS 118 (III) AFTER-MARKETS AND ICT INDUSTRIES 121 (IV) MARKET DEFINITION: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY ....122 V. MARKET POWER 128 A. MARKET POWER: PRICING POWER AND EXCLUSIONARY POWER 128 B. MARKET POWER IN THE CONTEXT OF ICT INDUSTRIES 129 C. SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES WITH EXISTENCE OF MARKET POWER IN THE ICT INDUSTRIES 130 (I) MARKET SHARE AND LEVEL OF CONCENTRATION 130 (II) BARRIERS TO EXPANSION OR ENTRY ; 131 D. MARKET POWER: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 133 6. UNILATERAL EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT AND ICT NETWORK INDUSTRIES 139 I. GENERAL COMMENTS ON UNILATERAL EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT AND ABUSE OF MARKET POWER..... 139 II. UNILATERAL EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 142 IMAGE 5 XU CONTENTS III. PREDATION 146 A. GENERAL 146 B. PREDATION AND ICT INDUSTRIES 147 (I) LEGAL STANDARD(S) FOR PREDATION IN ICT INDUSTRIES 147 (II) DETECTION OF PREDATION: WINNER-TAKES-(ALMOST)-ALL MARKETS VERSUS 
992 |a NETWORK EFFECTS AND STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE 149 C. PREDATION: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 151 IV. TYING AND BUNDLING 159 A. GENERAL 159 B. TYING AND BUNDLING AND ICT INDUSTRIES 161 C. TYING AND BUNDLING: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 162 V. EXCLUSIVE DEALING 170 A. GENERAL 170 B. EXCLUSIVE DEALING AND ICT INDUSTRIES 171 C. EXCLUSIVE DEALING: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 173 VI. REFUSAL TO DEAL 176 A. GENERAL 176 B. REFUSAL TO DEAL AND ICT INDUSTRIES 179 (I) DUTY TO DEAL: EQUIVALENCE OF PHYSICAL PROPERTY AND IPRS 179 (II) UNILATERAL COMPATIBILITY DECISIONS, INTERCONNECTION AND MANDATING ACCESS 180 C. REFUSAL TO DEAL: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY : 183 7. COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR AND ICT NETWORK INDUSTRIES 193 I. GENERAL COMMENTS ON HORIZONTAL CO-OPERATION AMONG DIRECT COMPETITORS 193 II. CO-OPERATIVE STANDARD SETTING 193 A. GENERAL 193 B. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF COMPATIBILITY AND STANDARD SETTING ..194 * C. ABUSE OF THE STANDARD SETTING PROCESS 196 D. CO-OPERATIVE STANDARD SETTING AND COMPETITION POLICY 197 E. CO-OPERATIVE STANDARD SETTING: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 198 III. ACCUMULATION OF IPRS: CROSS-LICENSING AND TECHNOLOGY POOLS 204 A. GENERAL 1 204 B. ACCUMULATION OF IPRS: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 206 IV. COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENT: RESEARCH AND PLATFORM JOINT VENTURE 210 A. GENERAL 210 B. COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 212 8. MERGERS AND ICT NETWORK INDUSTRIES 217 I. GENERAL 217 II. HORIZONTAL MERGERS ; 219 A. HORIZONTAL MERGERS AND COMPETITION IN THE MARKET 219 B. HORIZONTAL MERGERS AND COMPETITION FOR THE MARKET 221 C. HORIZONTAL MERGERS: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 222 III. NON-HORIZONTAL MERGERS 228 A. GENERAL 228 B. NON-HORIZONTAL MERGERS: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 230 IMAGE 6 CONTENTS XLLL 9. TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS AND COMPETITIVE HARM 237 I. GENERAL 237 
992 |a II. TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING EU COMPETITION POLICY 239 10. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 244 BIBLIOGRAPHY 249 INDEX 265 

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