Giving in dictator games: regard for others or regard by others?

1. Person: Koch, Alexander Karl
Weitere Personen: Normann, Hans-Theo
Quelle: Southern economic journal (2008), Bd. 75 (2008), 1, S. 223 - 231
Weitere Artikel
Format: Artikel Zeitschrift
Sprache: English
Veröffentlicht: 2008
Ausgabe: Kopie
Schlagworte: Recent bargaining experiments demonstrate an effect of anonymity and incomplete information on behavior. This has rekindled the question whether "fair" behavior is inspired by regard for others or driven by external forces. To test this, we compare a dictator game treatment that provides receivers with information about the source of offers with one that does not, controlling for anonymity in a double-blind setting. Combined with extant results, our findings suggest that about half of dictator giving observed in experiments is internally motivated, and the other half is driven by external factors, such as experimenter observability or regard by receivers
Economic theory
Game theory
Economic models
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