Games, strategies, and decision making

This book on game theory introduces and develops the key concepts with a minimum of mathematics. Students are presented with empirical evidence, anecdotes and strategic situations to help them apply theory and gain a genuine insight into human behaviour. The book provides a diverse collection of exa... Ausführliche Beschreibung

1. Person: Harrington, Joseph Emmett
Format: Buch
Genre: Lehrbuch
Sprache: English
Veröffentlicht: New York, NY Worth Publ. 2009
Beschreibung: XXIII, 532 S.
Ausgabe: 1. print.
Schlagworte (SWD): Spieltheorie
Schlagworte (STW): Spieltheorie
Theorie
Schlagworte (SH): Decision making
Game theory > Decision making
Games of strategy (Mathematics)
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300 |a XXIII, 532 S. 
520 |a This book on game theory introduces and develops the key concepts with a minimum of mathematics. Students are presented with empirical evidence, anecdotes and strategic situations to help them apply theory and gain a genuine insight into human behaviour. The book provides a diverse collection of examples and scenarios from history, literature, sports, crime, theology, war, biology, and everyday life. These examples come with rich context that adds real-world meat to the skeleton of theory. Each chapter begins with a specific strategic situation and is followed with a systematic treatment that gradually builds understanding of the concept. 
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992 |a JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY WORTH PUBLISHERS BRIEF CONTENTS PREFACE XV INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC REASONING 1 BUILDING A MODEL OF A STRATEGIC SITUATION 17 SCHAPTIER3 ELIMINATING THE IMPOSSIBLE: SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE 55 CHAPTER 4 STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE GAMES WITH TWO OR THREE PLAYERS 89 CHAPTER 5 STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE N-PLAYER GAMES 117 CHAPTER 6 STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN CONTINUOUS GAMES ...147 CHATTER 7 KEEP 'EM GUESSING: RANDOMIZED STRATEGIES 181 CHAPTER 8 TAKING TURNS: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION 219 CHATTER 9 TAKING TURNS IN THE DARK: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION 255 VIL CHAPTER 10 I KNOW SOMETHING YOU DON'T KNOW: GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION 291 CJAPTERJM WHAT YOU DO TELLS ME WHO YOU ARE: SIGNALING GAMES 325 LIES AND THE LYING LIARS THAT TELL THEM: CHEAP TALK GAMES 359 CHAPTEJM3 PLAYING FOREVER: REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY LIVED PLAYERS 391 C AJPJJJMJ- COOPERATION AND REPUTATION: APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY LIVED PLAYERS 423 INTERACTION IN INFINITELY LIVED INSTITUTIONS 451 CHAPTER 16 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY: EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES 479 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY: REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 507 ANSWERS TO "CHECK YOUR UNDERSTANDING" QUESTIONS S-1 GLOSSARY G-1 INDEX 1-1 BRIEF CONTENTS VIII COMPETITION FOR ELECTED OFFICE 38 THE SCIENCE 84 GAME 39 2.6 MOVING FROM THE EXTENSIVE FORM AND STRATEGIC FORM 39 BASEBALL, II 39 GALILEO GALILEI AND THE INQUISITION, II 40 CONTENTS PREFACE XV INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC REASONING 1 1.1 WHO WANTS TO BE A GAME THEORIST? ... 1 1.2 A SAMPLING OF STRATEGIC SITUATIONS 3 1.3 WHETTING YOUR APPETITE: THE GAME OF CONCENTRATION 5 1.4 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF A PLAYER 8 1.4.1 PREFERENCES 8 1.4.2 BELIEFS 11 1.4.3 HOW DO PLAYERS DIFFER? 12 1.5 PLAYING THE GENDER PRONOUN GAME... 13 REFERENCES 14 
992 |a BUILDING A MODEL OF A STRATEGIC SITUATION 17 2.1 INTRODUCTION 17 2.2 EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES: PERFECT INFORMATION 18 BASEBALL, I 21 GALILEO GALILEI AND THE INQUISITION, I 22 HAGGLING AT AN AUTO DEALERSHIP, I 24 2.3 EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES: IMPERFECT INFORMATION 27 MUGGING 29 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 30 THE IRAQ WAR AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ... 32 2.4 WHAT IS A STRATEGY? 34 2.5 STRATEGIC FORM GAMES 36 TOSCA 37 HAGGLING AT AN AUTO DEALERSHIP, II 41 2.7 GOING FROM THE STRATEGIC FORM TO THE EXTENSIVE FORM 42 2.8 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 43 2.9 A FEW MORE ISSUES IN MODELING GAMES 45 SUMMARY 48 EXERCISES 49 REFERENCES 54 CHAPTER 3 ELIMINATING THE IMPOSSIBLE: SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE 55 3.1 INTRODUCTION 55 3.2 SOLVING A GAME WHEN PLAYERS ARE RATIONAL 56 3.2.1 STRICT DOMINANCE 56 WHITE FLIGHT AND RACIAL SEGREGATION IN HOUSING 59 BANNING CIGARETTE ADVERTISING ON TELEVISION 60 3.2.2 WEAK DOMINANCE 64 BIDDING AT AN AUCTION 64 THE PROXY BID PARADOX AT EBAY 66 3.3 SOLVING A GAME WHEN PLAYERS ARE RATIONAL AND PLAYERS KNOW THAT PLAYERS ARE RATIONAL 68 TEAM-PROJECT GAME 68 IX JEMFLLIJLL STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE N-PLAYER GAMES 117 5.1 INTRODUCTION 117 5.2 SYMMETRIC GAMES 118 THE SNEETCHES 119 AIRLINE SECURITY 122 OPERATING SYSTEMS: MAC OR WINDOWS? 125 APPLYING FOR AN INTERNSHIP 128 5.3 ASYMMETRIC GAMES 130 ENTRY INTO A MARKET 130 CIVIL UNREST 134 5.4 SELECTING AMONG NASH EQUILIBRIA .. . 137 SUMMARY 141 EXERCISES 141 EXISTENCE-OF-GOD GAME 70 BOXED-PIGS GAME 71 3.4 SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE 73 3.4.1 THE DOPING GAME: IS IT RATIONAL FOR ATHLETES TO USE STEROIDS? 73 3.4.2 ITERATIVE DELETION OF STRICTLY DOMINATED STRATEGIES 76 SUMMARY 78 EXERCISES 79 3.5 APPENDIX: STRICT AND WEAK DOMINANCE 84 3.6 APPENDIX: RATIONALIZABILITY (ADVANCED) 84 REFERENCES 87 CJFAPTER STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE GAMES WITH TWO OR THREE PLAYERS 89 4.1 DEFINING NASH EQUILIBRIUM 89 4.2 
992 |a CLASSIC TWO-PLAYER GAMES 92 PRISONERS' DILEMMA 93 A COORDINATION GAME*DRIVING CONVENTIONS 95 A GAME OF COORDINATION AND CONFLICT*TELEPHONE .. 95 AN OUTGUESSING GAME*ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS 97 CONFLICT AND MUTUAL INTEREST IN GAMES 99 4.3 THE BEST-REPLY METHOD 99 4.4 THREE-PLAYER GAMES 101 AMERICAN IDOL FANDOM 101 VOTING, SINCERE OR DEVIOUS? 102 PROMOTION AND SABOTAGE 106 4.5 FOUNDATIONS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM ... 109 4.5.1 RELATIONSHIP TO RATIONALITY IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE 109 4.5.2 THE DEFINITION OF A STRATEGY, REVISITED .110 SUMMARY 111 EXERCISES 112 4.6 APPENDIX: FORMAL DEFINITION OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM 116 REFERENCES 116 REFERENCES 145 JILAFLLJLJL STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN CONTINUOUS GAMES 147 6.1 INTRODUCTION 147 6.2 SOLVING FOR NASH EQUILIBRIA WITHOUT CALCULUS 148 PRICE COMPETITION WITH IDENTICAL PRODUCTS 149 NEUTRALIZING PRICE COMPETITION WITH PRICE-MATCHING GUARANTEES 152 COMPETING FOR ELECTED OFFICE 154 6.3 SOLVING FOR NASH EQUILIBRIA WITH CALCULUS (OPTIONAL) 157 PRICE COMPETITION WITH DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 160 TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS* THE EXTINCTION OF THE WOOLLY MAMMOTH 164 CHARITABLE GIVING AND THE POWER OF MATCHING GRANTS 769 SUMMARY 174 EXERCISES 175 REFERENCES 179 X 8.3 EXAMPLES 225 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 225 ENRON AND PROSECUTORIAL PREROGATIVE 227 KEEP 'EM GUESSING: RANDOMIZED STRATEGIES 181 7.1 POLICE PATROLS AND THE DRUG TRADE 181 7.2 MAKING DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY 182 7.2.1 PROBABILITY AND EXPECTATION 182 7.2.2 PREFERENCES OVER UNCERTAIN OPTIONS ... 185 7.2.3 ORDINAL VS. CARDINAL PAYOFFS 186 7.3 MIXED STRATEGIES AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM 187 7.3.1 BACK ON THE BEAT 187 7.3.2 SOME GENERAL PROPERTIES OF A NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MIXED STRATEGIES 191 7.4 EXAMPLES 192 AVRANCHES GAP IN WORLD WAR II 7 93 ENTRY INTO A MARKET 197 7.5 ADVANCED EXAMPLES 198 PENALTY KICK IN SOCCER 198 SLASH 'EM UP: FRIDAY THE 13TH 201 BYSTANDER EFFECT 204 7.6 GAMES OF PURE CONFLICT AND CAUTIOUS BEHAVIOR 207 SUMMARY 211 EXERCISES 212 7.7 APPENDIX: FORMAL DEFINITION OF NASH 
992 |a EQUILIBRIUM IN MIXED STRATEGIES 215 REFERENCES 216 CHAPTER 8 TAKING TURNS: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION 219 8.1 INTRODUCTION 219 8.2 BACKWARD INDUCTION AND SUBGAME PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM 221 RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND SPORTS 229 8.4 WAITING GAMES: PREEMPTION AND ATTRITION 235 8.4.1 PREEMPTION 236 8.4.2 WAR OF ATTRITION 238 8.5 DO PEOPLE REASON USING BACKWARD INDUCTION? 239 8.5.1 EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE AND BACKWARD INDUCTION 239 8.5.2 A LOGICAL PARADOX WITH BACKWARD INDUCTION 242 SUMMARY 243 EXERCISES 244 REFERENCES 254 N J1MJLIIJLL TAKING TURNS IN THE DARK: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION 255 9.1 INTRODUCTION 255 9.2 SUBGAME PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM , 257 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE 260 9.3 EXAMPLES 263 OS/2 264 AGENDA CONTROL IN THE SENATE 268 9.4 COMMITMENT 270 9.4.1 DETERRENCE OF ENTRY 270 9.4.2 MANAGERIAL CONTRACTS AND COMPETITION: EAST INDIA TRADE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 277 SUMMARY 280 EXERCISES 281 REFERENCES 289 CONTENTS XI COURTSHIP 337 BRINKMANSHIP 343 SUMMARY 346 EXERCISES 348 11.4 APPENDIX: BAYES'S RULE AND UPDATING BELIEFS 354 C CHAPTEJMO I KNOW SOMETHING YOU DON'T KNOW: GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION 291 10.1 INTRODUCTION 291 10.2 A GAME OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: THE MUNICH AGREEMENT .... 291 10.3 BAYESIAN GAMES AND BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM 296 GUNFIGHT IN THE WILD WEST 298 10.4 WHEN ALL PLAYERS HAVE PRIVATE INFORMATION: AUCTIONS 301 INDEPENDENT PRIVATE VALUES AND SHADING YOUR BID 302 COMMON VALUE AND THE WINNER'S CURSE 304 10.5 VOTING ON COMMITTEES AND JURIES 307 10.5.1 STRATEGIC ABSTENTION 307 10.5.2 SEQUENTIAL VOTING IN THE JURY ROOM ... 309 SUMMARY 312 EXERCISES 313 10.6 APPENDIX: FORMAL DEFINITION OF BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM 318 10.7 APPENDIX: FIRST-PRICE, SEALED-BID AUCTION WITH A CONTINUUM OF TYPES 319 10.7.1 INDEPENDENT PRIVATE VALUES 319 10.7.2 COMMON VALUE 321 REFERENCES 323 WHAT YOU DO TELLS ME WHO YOU ARE: SIGNALING GAMES 325 11.1 INTRODUCTION 325 11.2 PERFECT BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM ... .326 MANAGEMENT 
992 |a TRAINEE 329 11.3 EXAMPLES 333 LEMONS AND THE MARKET FOR USED CARS 333 REFERENCES 357 LIES AND THE LYING LIARS THAT TELL THEM: CHEAP TALK GAMES 359 12.1 INTRODUCTION 359 12.2 COMMUNICATION IN A GAME-THEORETIC WORLD 360 12.3 SIGNALING INFORMATION 363 DEFENSIVE MEDICINE 363 STOCK RECOMMENDATIONS 367 12.4 SIGNALING INTENTIONS 374 12.4.1 PREPLAY COMMUNICATION IN THEORY 374 12.4.2 PREPLAY COMMUNICATION IN PRACTICE.... 379 SUMMARY 381 EXERCISES '. 382 REFERENCES 388 CHA_PTEJM_3 PLAYING FOREVER: REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY LIVED PLAYERS 391 13.1 TRENCH WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I 391 1 3.2 CONSTRUCTING A REPEATED GAME ... 393 13.3 TRENCH WARFARE: FINITE HORIZON .... 398 13.4 TRENCH WARFARE: INFINITE HORIZON 401 1 3.5 SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FOR THE REPEATED PRISONERS' DILEMMA ... 406 SUMMARY 410 EXERCISES 411 XII 13.6 APPENDIX: PRESENT VALUE OF A PAYOFF STREAM 416 13.7 APPENDIX: DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING 420 REFERENCES 422 CHAPTER 14 COOPERATION AND REPUTATION: APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY LIVED PLAYERS 423 14.1 INTRODUCTION 423 14.2 A MENU OF PUNISHMENTS 424 14.2.1 PRICE-FIXING 424 14.2.2 TEMPORARY REVERSION TO MODERATE RATES 427 14.2.3 PRICE WARS: TEMPORARY REVERSION TO LOW RATES 428 14.2.4 A MORE EQUITABLE PUNISHMENT 430 14.3 QUID-PRO-QUO 431 U.S. CONGRESS AND PORK-BARREL SPENDING 431 VAMPIRE BATS AND RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM 434 14.4 REPUTATION 437 LENDING TO KINGS 437 HENRY FORD AND THE $5 WORKDAY 439 14.5 IMPERFECT MONITORING AND ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES 441 SUMMARY 444 EXERCISES 445 REFERENCES 450 CHAPTER 15 INTERACTION IN INFINITELY LIVED INSTITUTIONS 451 15.1 INTRODUCTION 451 15.2 COOPERATION WITH OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS 452 TRIBAL DEFENSE 453 TAKING CARE OF YOUR ELDERLY PARENTS 456 POLITICAL PARTIES AND LAME-DUCK PRESIDENTS 458 15.3 COOPERATION IN A LARGE POPULATION 463 EBAY 464 MEDIEVAL LAW MERCHANT 469 SUMMARY 473 EXERCISES 474 REFERENCES 478 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY: EVOLUTIONARILY 
992 |a STABLE STRATEGIES 479 16.1 INTRODUCING EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY 479 16.2 HAWK-DOVE CONFLICT 481 16.3 EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY 484 "STAYIN' ALIVE" ON A COWPAT 488 16.4 PROPERTIES OF AN ESS 491 SIDE-BLOTCHED LIZARDS 493 16.5 MULTIPOPULATION GAMES 496 PARENTAL CARE 497 16.6 EVOLUTION OF SPITE 499 SUMMARY 501 EXERCISES 502 REFERENCES 505 CHAPTER J_7 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY: REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 507 17.1 INTRODUCTION 507 17.2 REPLICATOR DYNAMICS AND THE HAWK-DOVE GAME 508 17.3 GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE REPLICATOR DYNAMIC 512 CONTENTS XIII 17.4 ESS AND ATTRACTORS OF THE EXERCISES 530 REPLICATOR DYNAMIC 513 REFERENCES 532 ' U . _., ANSWERS TO "CHECK YOUR UNDERSTANDING" STAG HUNT 515 CH HANDEDNESS IN BASEBALL 517 QUESTIONS B-1 EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 521 GLOSSARY G-1 SUMMARY 529 INDEX 1-1 XIV 

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