EVIDENCE FOR RELATIONAL CONTRACTS IN SOVEREIGN BANK LENDING

This paper presents direct evidence for relational contracts in sovereign bank lending. Unlike the existing empirical literature, its instrumental variables method allows for distinguishing a direct influence of past repayment problems on current spreads (a “punishment” effect in prices) from an... indirect effect through higher expected future default probabilities (“loss of reputation”). Such a punishment provides positive surplus to lenders after a default and decreases the borrower's present discounted value of the net benefits of future borrowing, which create dynamic incentives. Using data on bank loans to developing countries for 1973–1981 and constructing continuous variables for credit history, we find evidence that most of the influence of past repayment problems is through the direct, punishment channel. Ausführliche Beschreibung Beschreibung ausblenden

1. Person:	Benczúr, Péter
Weitere Personen:	Ilut, Cosmin L
Quelle:	in Journal of the European Economic Association Vol. 14, No. 2 (2016), p. 375-404 Weitere Artikel
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	2016
Online Zugang:	Volltext Online Online
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Anmerkung:	Copyright: © 2015 by the European Economic Association